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Executive	  summary	  
Nigeria	  has	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  scores	  on	  corruption	  and	  governance	  despite	  the	  size	  of	  its	  
economy.	  This	  performance	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  oil	  
and	  gas	  rich	  economies.	  While	  Nigeria's	  per	  capita	  income	  is	  high	  for	  its	  level	  of	  
development,	  its	  natural	  resource	  wealth	  has	  meant	  an	  undiversified	  economy.	  Pervasive	  
rent	  capture	  marks	  its	  highly	  opaque	  oil	  economy,	  and	  these	  rents	  lead	  to	  distributive	  
conflicts	  that	  frequently	  turn	  violent.	  Economic	  growth	  in	  recent	  times	  has	  been	  hampered	  
by	  a	  steep	  fall	  in	  oil	  prices.	  Attempts	  at	  reforming	  the	  oil	  sector	  have	  been	  largely	  
unsuccessful,	  owing	  to	  stiff	  resistance	  from	  incumbent	  regimes	  who	  have	  entrenched	  
interests	  in	  the	  parallel	  oil	  economy,	  involving	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  national	  leadership,	  
international	  oil	  companies	  and	  even	  warlords	  in	  the	  country’s	  conflict	  ridden	  oil	  rich	  south	  
east.	  Other	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  have	  also	  not	  grown	  owing	  to	  the	  dependence	  on	  oil.	  
This	  deeply	  structural	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  chief	  constraint	  to	  productivity	  growth.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand	  redistribution	  of	  oil	  rents	  allows	  some	  'live	  and	  let	  live'	  arrangements	  
between	  different	  political	  coalitions	  and	  at	  least	  in	  part	  sustains	  political	  stability	  in	  the	  
country.	  	  
From	  the	  military	  regimes	  of	  the	  1970s,	  to	  the	  political	  parties	  after	  the	  democratic	  
transition	  in	  1999,	  different	  political	  arrangements	  have	  been	  sustained	  on	  these	  rents.	  The	  
political	  settlement	  in	  the	  country	  is	  now	  evolving	  into	  a	  competitive	  clientelist	  one,	  with	  the	  
once	  dominant	  party	  facing	  competition	  from	  a	  unified	  opposition	  that	  has	  coalesced	  into	  a	  
now-­‐incumbent	  political	  party.	  Greater	  political	  mobilisation,	  and	  devolution	  of	  some	  fiscal	  
power	  to	  the	  states,	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  political	  ‘entrepreneurs’	  who	  owe	  little	  allegiance	  to	  
one	  party	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  cross	  over	  to	  opposing	  parties,	  depending	  on	  the	  relative	  power	  
of	  each	  party.	  The	  need	  of	  parties	  to	  provide	  more	  informal	  transfers,	  and	  include	  greater	  
numbers,	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  increase	  factionalism	  and	  rent	  capture.	  Political	  
corruption	  is	  deeply	  entrenched	  and	  some	  sections	  of	  the	  state	  have	  also	  seen	  predatory	  
capture,	  especially	  in	  the	  oil	  sector.	  
This	  makes	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  reforms	  especially	  difficult	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  country	  is	  
a	  signatory	  to	  some	  major	  transparency	  agreements	  for	  the	  extractives	  sector	  and	  to	  curb	  
illicit	  financial	  flows.	  These	  have	  not	  been	  successful	  due	  to	  the	  structural	  processes	  of	  
informal	  power	  relationships	  described	  above.	  The	  political	  corruption	  in	  these	  contexts	  is	  
often	  a	  manifestation	  of	  this	  informality	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  rents.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  
incremental	  anti-­‐corruption	  reforms	  that	  focus	  on	  improving	  developmental	  outcomes	  at	  
the	  sectoral	  level	  have	  to	  be	  undertaken.	  The	  paper	  develops	  an	  analysis	  of	  economic	  drivers	  
and	  political	  settlements	  to	  identify	  a	  range	  of	  sectoral	  issues	  where	  an	  incremental	  and	  
sector-­‐specific	  anti-­‐corruption	  approach	  can	  lead	  to	  feasible	  and	  effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  
strategies	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Evidence	  programme	  (ACE)approach.	  
Valuable	  research	  assistance	  by	  Olayinka	  Babalola	  is	  gratefully	  acknowledged.	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1. Introduction	  
A	  rebasing	  exercise	  in	  2013	  almost	  doubled	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  economy,	  from	  NGN	  
42.4	  trillion	  to	  NGN	  80.2	  trillion	  (USD	  510	  billion),	  by	  changing	  the	  base	  year	  for	  calculating	  
GDP	  from	  1990	  to	  2010.	  The	  first	  time	  a	  rebasing	  was	  done	  in	  24	  years,	  the	  move	  made	  it	  
Africa’s	  largest	  economy	  and	  increased	  the	  contribution	  of	  services	  and	  manufacturing	  to	  
the	  economy	  while	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry	  decreased.	  However	  oil	  remains	  
the	  major	  contributor	  to	  government	  revenues,	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  population	  of	  175	  
million	  still	  live	  on	  less	  than	  USD	  1.75	  a	  day.	  Insurgencies,	  both	  low	  level	  and	  critical,	  have	  
been	  buffeting	  the	  country	  at	  a	  time	  that	  oil	  prices	  have	  been	  at	  their	  lowest.	  The	  uptick	  in	  
growth	  numbers	  brought	  by	  about	  the	  rebasing	  hasn’t	  been	  reflected	  in	  Nigeria’s	  ranking	  in	  
the	  World	  Governance	  Indicators.	  As	  Figure	  1	  shows,	  the	  country	  is	  the	  lowest	  ranked	  based	  
on	  all	  the	  governance	  indicators	  of	  political	  stability/no	  violence,	  government	  effectiveness,	  
rule	  of	  law,	  regulatory	  quality,	  voice	  and	  accountability	  and	  control	  of	  corruption,	  when	  
compared	  to	  Ghana,	  its	  neighbour	  in	  west	  Africa,	  and	  South	  Africa	  a	  reasonable	  comparator	  
country.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  small	  rise	  in	  government	  effectiveness,	  perhaps	  owing	  to	  the	  
election	  of	  Muhammadu	  Buhari	  as	  president.	  His	  government	  was	  elected	  with	  a	  strong	  
majority	  on	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  mandate	  in	  2015,	  and	  there	  were	  some	  early	  efforts	  at	  trying	  
to	  rein	  in	  corruption,	  which	  is	  often	  perceived	  to	  be	  endemic	  in	  the	  country.	  
Corruption	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  in	  the	  country,	  yet	  it	  remains	  a	  
pervasive	  constraint	  for	  doing	  business	  across	  sectors,	  as	  is	  seen	  from	  Figure	  2.	  Corruption	  
was	  ranked	  as	  the	  second	  most	  problematic	  factor	  for	  doing	  business	  by	  executives	  in	  
Nigeria	  in	  the	  Executive	  Opinion	  Survey	  by	  the	  World	  Economic	  Forum.	  This	  was	  second	  only	  
to	  ‘inadequate	  supply	  of	  infrastructure’	  and	  closely	  followed	  by	  ‘access	  to	  financing’,	  all	  of	  
which	  are	  factors	  closely	  related	  to	  inefficiencies	  due	  to	  corruption	  and	  rent	  capture.	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Figure	  1:	  Nigeria	  Governance	  Rankings	  2005-­‐2015	  
	   	  
	   	  
	   	  
Source:	  World	  Governance	  Indicators	  2016	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Figure	  2:	  Most	  Problematic	  Factors	  for	  Doing	  Business	  in	  Nigeria	  2016	  
	  
Source:	  Executive	  Opinion	  Survey	  (World	  Economic	  Forum	  2016:	  110).	  The	  numbers	  are	  weighted	  scores	  of	  each	  factor.	  
The	  All	  Progressives	  Congress	  (APC)	  government,	  headed	  by	  Buhari,	  remains	  committed	  to	  
anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  but,	  as	  this	  paper	  will	  show,	  these	  are	  hampered	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
Nigerian	  political	  settlement,	  where	  resources	  are	  captured	  by	  powerful	  members	  of	  the	  
establishment	  who	  cannot	  be	  disciplined.	  Equally	  important	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  function	  of	  
this	  rent	  capture	  is	  to	  create	  political	  stability	  in	  a	  country	  that	  is	  riven	  with	  violent	  factional	  
conflicts.	  This	  analysis	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  settlement	  in	  no	  manner	  
condones	  it.	  The	  political	  corruption	  we	  identify	  here	  describes	  rent	  creation	  and	  
distribution	  through	  informal	  patron-­‐client	  networks,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  which	  powerful	  
patrons	  maintain	  power	  and	  stability	  (Khan	  2005,	  2010;	  North	  et	  al	  2013).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  
a	  strong	  formal	  economy	  and	  broad-­‐based	  redistribution	  through	  budgetary	  allocations,	  rent	  
capture	  and	  its	  distribution	  through	  informal	  means	  achieves	  a	  measure	  of	  political	  
stabilisation	  without	  which	  existential	  threats	  to	  the	  country	  would	  be	  even	  greater.	  Though	  
some	  of	  the	  ideologies	  used	  in	  Nigeria	  to	  mobilise	  constituencies	  are	  more	  instrumental	  
than	  substantive,	  the	  conflicts	  they	  foster	  are	  intense.	  	  
As	  we	  shall	  see	  later	  in	  the	  paper,	  while	  ideological	  fault	  lines	  exist	  in	  Nigeria,	  opposing	  sides	  
have	  often	  managed	  to	  find	  solutions,	  albeit	  fragile	  ones.	  Therefore	  devising	  an	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategy	  in	  such	  a	  context	  needs	  a	  nuanced	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  create	  policy	  that	  
is	  targeted	  at	  the	  right	  sectors	  where	  intervention	  is	  both	  impactful	  and	  feasible,	  in	  line	  with	  
the	  ACE	  framework	  (Khan	  et	  al	  2017).	  To	  be	  sure,	  political	  corruption	  can	  often	  collapse	  into	  
damaging	  predatory	  corruption	  and	  this	  is	  certainly	  true	  in	  some	  instances	  in	  Nigeria	  and	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  instability	  
Foreign	  currency	  regulaeons	  
Access	  to	  ﬁnancing	  
Corrupeon	  
Inadequate	  supply	  of	  infrastructure	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late	  developers	  (Khan	  2010;	  Stiglitz	  1989;	  North	  et	  al	  2012).	  However	  the	  distribution	  of	  
power	  or	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  many	  developing	  countries	  makes	  the	  enforcement	  or	  
disciplining	  of	  such	  rents	  difficult.	  They	  could	  then	  get	  captured	  for	  unproductive	  reasons,	  as	  
we	  shall	  see	  later	  in	  the	  paper	  in	  section	  3,	  for	  instance	  through	  ‘policy	  distorting	  corruption’	  
(Khan	  2005,	  2009;	  Khan	  et	  al	  2017).	  This	  makes	  an	  analysis	  of	  Nigeria’s	  political	  settlement	  
even	  more	  vital	  in	  understanding	  the	  drivers	  of	  corruption.	  	  
Nigeria	  gained	  independence	  from	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK)	  in	  1960	  and	  had	  a	  civilian	  
government	  until	  two	  significant	  military	  coups	  took	  place	  in	  1966,	  culminating	  in	  the	  
Biafran	  war	  of	  independence.	  Their	  effects	  continue	  to	  have	  significance	  in	  Nigerian	  politics,	  
but	  the	  substantive	  role	  this	  plays	  has	  been	  reducing	  over	  the	  years.	  However	  the	  narratives	  
behind	  the	  coups	  are	  still	  used	  for	  purposes	  of	  mobilising	  political	  constituencies.	  The	  
regional	  dimension	  of	  the	  devastating	  Biafran	  war	  has	  continued	  significance,	  as	  the	  
outbreaks	  of	  violence	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  oil	  resources	  in	  the	  Delta	  area	  frequently	  
invoke	  the	  sense	  of	  injustice	  that	  led	  to	  the	  war.	  It	  does	  need	  to	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  
despite	  a	  common	  perception	  that	  Nigeria’s	  first	  civilian	  government	  mainly	  reflected	  its	  
regional	  and	  ethnic	  differences	  of	  the	  Hausa	  Fulani	  in	  the	  north,	  Yoruba	  in	  the	  south	  west	  
and	  the	  Igbo	  in	  the	  south	  east,	  even	  in	  this	  phase	  there	  were	  attempts	  at	  coalition-­‐building	  
across	  the	  three	  regions,	  though	  the	  coups	  in	  1966	  upset	  any	  possibilities	  to	  cement	  those.	  	  
Military	  governments	  continued	  in	  power	  till	  1979,	  through	  a	  series	  of	  violent	  and	  
sometimes	  bloodless	  coups.	  Power	  was	  handed	  back	  to	  a	  civilian	  government	  in	  1979	  by	  
General	  Olusegun	  Obasanjo	  (who	  later	  became	  a	  civilian	  president	  in	  1999	  and	  is	  now	  an	  
elder	  statesman	  in	  Nigerian	  politics).	  A	  coup	  once	  again	  overturned	  the	  democratic	  
government	  in	  1983	  and	  military	  rule	  lasted	  till	  1999.	  There	  were	  attempts	  to	  renew	  
democracy	  in	  this	  period	  but	  the	  efforts	  were	  not	  sustained.	  The	  last	  period	  of	  military	  rule	  
was	  under	  the	  controversial	  general	  Sani	  Abacha,	  whose	  regime	  was	  known	  for	  both	  violent	  
repression	  and	  state	  capture,	  especially	  of	  oil	  resources.	  His	  assassination	  led	  to	  the	  
restitution	  of	  democracy	  in	  1999,	  overseen	  this	  time	  by	  another	  military	  general.	  The	  
People’s	  Democratic	  Party	  (PDP)	  was	  established	  as	  the	  main	  political	  party	  after	  it	  won	  local	  
council	  elections	  in	  1998.	  The	  Nigerian	  political	  settlement	  has	  changed	  significantly	  since	  
the	  years	  of	  military	  rule,	  as	  has	  the	  nature	  of	  rent	  seeking.	  The	  consequences	  of	  growth	  for	  
this	  have	  also	  been	  significant	  and	  are	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.	  
The	  ACE	  programme	  framework	  of	  political	  settlement	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  tackling	  
damaging	  rent	  seeking	  and	  corruption	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  challenge,	  and	  the	  best	  way	  for	  this	  to	  
occur	  is	  to	  foster	  a	  broad	  based	  productive	  economy.	  However,	  despite	  the	  stability-­‐
inducing	  functions	  of	  some	  forms	  of	  rent	  seeking,	  informal	  rent	  generation	  and	  allocation	  
will	  always	  remain	  constraints	  on	  economic	  transition.	  Stability	  could	  be	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  
providing	  rents	  to	  powerful	  constituencies,	  who	  might	  otherwise	  threaten	  the	  ruling	  
coalition,	  and	  this	  could	  block	  meaningful	  developmental	  outcomes	  (Khan	  2011).	  The	  policy	  
framing	  process	  is	  therefore	  always	  at	  a	  knife	  edge	  in	  developing	  countries,	  where	  reform	  
has	  to	  address	  political	  corruption,	  but	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  eases	  developmental	  bottlenecks	  
without	  threatening	  stability.	  Powerful	  actors	  in	  Nigeria	  will	  resist	  reform	  that	  is	  against	  their	  
interests,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  some	  sectors	  in	  the	  economy	  circumstances	  are	  so	  adverse	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that	  reform	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  long	  term,	  while	  other	  opportunities	  for	  relatively	  less	  
difficult	  policy	  implementation	  should	  be	  pursued.	  	  
As	  the	  economy	  grows,	  more	  productive	  and	  more	  firms	  that	  can	  benefit	  from	  formal	  rules	  
emerge,	  and	  pressure	  from	  them	  for	  more	  ambitious	  reform	  is	  likely	  to	  drive	  the	  anti-­‐
corruption	  agenda	  in	  positive	  directions.	  The	  Buhari	  administration	  has	  already	  taken	  the	  
right	  steps	  by	  publishing	  financial	  results	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  Nigerian	  National	  Petroleum	  
Corporation	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  ten	  years,	  and	  despite	  some	  opposition	  to	  its	  manner	  of	  
implementation,	  setting	  up	  the	  Treasury	  Single	  Account,	  meant	  to	  consolidate	  inflows	  from	  
all	  government	  agencies	  into	  one	  account	  in	  order	  to	  track	  leakages	  and	  increase	  
transparency.	  However,	  sustainably	  formalising	  these	  reforms	  will	  take	  time.	  The	  economy	  
still	  remains	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  oil	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  oil	  prices	  has	  affected	  Nigeria	  
adversely.	  According	  to	  Nigeria’s	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  oil	  accounts	  for	  69	  percent	  of	  
exports	  and	  close	  to	  70	  percent	  of	  federal	  government	  revenue	  (Voice	  of	  America,	  2016).	  In	  
the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2016	  foreign	  direct	  inflows	  fell	  by	  37	  percent	  year-­‐on-­‐year,	  and	  capital	  
inflows	  by	  75.7	  percent	  (Financial	  Times,	  2016).	  However	  this	  could	  prove	  to	  be	  an	  
opportunity	  for	  the	  country	  to	  rebalance	  its	  economy	  and	  move	  toward	  more	  productive	  
sectors	  in	  manufacturing	  and	  services.	  We	  envisage	  the	  sectoral	  approach	  of	  the	  ACE	  
programme	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  contributor	  in	  this	  respect.	  
The	  elections	  of	  2015	  marked	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  of	  Nigeria,	  as	  an	  incumbent	  
government	  was	  voted	  out	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  independence.	  The	  incumbent	  People’s	  
Democratic	  Party	  (PDP),	  which	  had	  been	  in	  power	  since	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  in	  1999,	  
was	  voted	  out	  by	  the	  All	  Progressives	  Congress	  (APC)	  formed	  by	  four	  regional	  parties.	  While	  
this	  might	  go	  some	  way	  to	  institutionalising	  a	  competitive	  democracy	  in	  Nigeria,	  it	  also	  
means	  the	  balance	  of	  internal	  power	  within	  the	  APC	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  key	  variable	  determining	  
its	  sustainability.	  It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  say,	  but	  Nigeria	  appears	  to	  be	  consolidating	  the	  informal	  
institutional	  mechanisms	  of	  changing	  ruling	  coalitions	  through	  elections.	  Put	  another	  way,	  
some	  of	  the	  informal	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  the	  last	  few	  elections	  were	  fought	  are	  now	  
being	  formalised.	  However,	  there	  are	  signs	  that	  the	  APC	  might	  be	  heading	  for	  an	  internecine	  
conflict	  as	  Buhari	  has	  stepped	  away	  temporarily	  from	  the	  leadership	  role,	  citing	  ill	  health,	  
while	  the	  Vice	  President	  Oluyemi	  Osinbajo	  has	  stepped	  in	  as	  Acting	  President.	  This	  has	  once	  
again	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  spectre	  of	  North-­‐South	  conflict	  in	  Nigerian	  politics,	  with	  many	  
disaffected	  leaders	  reading	  this	  as	  a	  possible	  schism	  in	  the	  top	  APC	  leadership	  and	  seeking	  to	  
further	  their	  own	  interests.	  This	  sort	  of	  fighting	  to	  signal	  the	  start	  of	  coalition	  building	  will	  
get	  more	  frenetic	  as	  elections	  approach.	  Given	  that	  elections	  are	  only	  two	  years	  away,	  these	  
developments	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  derail	  a	  relatively	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  the	  next	  
democratically	  elected	  regime,	  as	  well	  as	  affect	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  an	  already	  
fragile	  economy.	  	  
The	  rest	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows,	  with	  section	  1	  providing	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  
Nigeria’s	  growth	  in	  both	  the	  oil	  and	  non-­‐oil	  sectors	  and	  the	  various	  policies	  followed	  by	  
successive	  Nigerian	  governments	  to	  stimulate	  growth.	  Section	  2	  provides	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  
political	  settlement	  in	  Nigeria	  and	  the	  resultant	  rent	  seeking	  that	  often	  leads	  to	  corruption	  
and	  poor	  governance.	  We	  will	  be	  analysing	  the	  period	  since	  the	  return	  of	  democracy	  to	  
Nigeria	  in	  1999,	  as	  that	  is	  a	  turning	  point	  signifying	  a	  major	  break	  in	  how	  the	  politics	  of	  the	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country	  is	  organised.	  The	  broad	  characteristics	  of	  democratic	  politics	  in	  Nigeria	  can	  therefore	  
be	  traced	  from	  this	  period.	  Section	  3	  outlines	  the	  various	  anti-­‐corruption	  policies	  undertaken	  
by	  governments	  so	  far,	  and	  section	  4	  provides	  our	  analysis	  of	  what	  the	  potential	  for	  strategic	  
anti-­‐corruption	  policies	  targeting	  specific	  sectors	  could	  be	  in	  Nigeria.	  	   	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Nigeria:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
10	  
2. Major	  sectors	  and	  drivers	  of	  
growth	  in	  Nigeria	  
One	  of	  the	  major	  turning	  points	  in	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  economy	  was	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  IMF-­‐led	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Programme	  (SAP)	  in	  1986.	  Against	  the	  
background	  of	  the	  1984	  oil	  crisis,	  the	  SAP	  was	  meant	  to	  restructure	  and	  diversify	  the	  
Nigerian	  economy,	  primarily	  to	  reduce	  dependence	  on	  oil	  and	  imported	  inputs,	  while	  
achieving	  low	  levels	  of	  inflation	  and	  balance	  of	  payments	  stability	  (Anyanwu,	  1992).	  
Although	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  reforms	  was	  marked	  by	  policy	  reversals	  and	  haphazard	  
implementation,	  there	  is	  some	  agreement	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  reforms	  on	  specific	  sectors	  
in	  the	  economy.	  While	  real	  GDP	  growth	  improved	  after	  having	  turned	  negative	  in	  the	  period	  
of	  the	  oil	  price	  crisis,	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Naira,	  interest	  rate	  deregulation	  and	  removal	  of	  
some	  subsidies	  negatively	  affected	  a	  broad	  swathe	  of	  sectors,	  	  including	  the	  auto	  
component,	  pharmaceutical	  and	  textile	  sectors,	  the	  last	  being	  one	  of	  the	  country’s	  biggest	  
employers	  (Mosley,	  1992;	  Nwankwo	  1988;	  Iwuagwu,	  2011;	  Adenikinju	  &	  Chete,	  2002;	  
Onyeiwu	  1997;	  Maiwada	  and	  Renne	  2013).	  The	  stated	  aim	  of	  reducing	  dependence	  on	  the	  
oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  did	  not	  bear	  out,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  import	  dependent	  sectors	  found	  it	  hard	  
to	  adjust	  to	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Naira.	  The	  SAP	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  only	  reason	  for	  
Nigeria’s	  dismal	  performance	  in	  manufacturing,	  which	  contributes	  to	  just	  over	  6	  percent	  of	  
GDP	  even	  after	  the	  rebasing.	  The	  same	  figure	  for	  South	  Africa	  is	  13	  percent	  and	  5	  percent	  for	  
Ghana	  (World	  Bank).	  	  
The	  recent	  rebasing	  in	  Nigeria	  also	  reduced	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  from	  32	  
percent	  to	  14	  percent	  (Bloomberg,	  2014).	  The	  share	  of	  services	  grew	  from	  26	  percent	  to	  51	  
percent	  and	  manufacturing	  from	  less	  than	  2	  percent	  to	  6.7	  percent	  (Premium	  Times,	  2014).	  
A	  preliminary	  analysis	  could	  well	  provide	  evidence	  for	  diversification	  of	  the	  economy	  away	  
from	  oil	  and	  gas	  with	  some	  incipient	  growth	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector,	  but	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  
some	  relevant	  statistics	  that	  follow	  later	  in	  this	  section	  suggests	  otherwise.	  Figure	  3	  below	  
captures	  the	  latest	  sectoral	  contributions	  to	  GDP.	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Sectoral	  contributions	  to	  Nigeria’s	  GDP	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Source:	  World	  Bank	  Socio	  Economic	  Indicators	  
Table	  1	  highlights	  the	  sub-­‐sectoral	  contributions	  to	  the	  three	  main	  sectors	  of	  GDP	  in	  the	  first	  
quarter	  of	  2016.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  is	  still	  a	  major	  contributor	  to	  
industry,	  with	  a	  share	  of	  42.3	  percent.	  Construction	  is	  the	  next	  largest	  contributor,	  followed	  
by	  food	  and	  beverages,	  and	  textiles	  and	  garments.	  The	  contribution	  of	  sectors	  that	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  be	  drivers	  of	  growth	  and	  employment	  -­‐	  like	  textiles,	  automotive,	  electricals	  and	  
pharmaceuticals	  -­‐	  have	  a	  very	  small	  share	  of	  the	  economy,	  suggesting	  its	  non-­‐diversified	  
nature.	  The	  inability	  to	  move	  away	  from	  crude	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  has	  been	  one	  of	  Nigeria’s	  
biggest	  failures.	  What	  compounds	  matters	  is	  that,	  despite	  being	  the	  eighth	  largest	  producer	  
of	  crude	  oil,	  the	  country	  still	  imports	  petrol	  or	  motor	  spirit	  and	  refining	  makes	  up	  less	  than	  1	  
percent	  of	  contribution	  to	  industry.	  In	  the	  services	  sector	  trade	  is	  the	  biggest	  contributor,	  
followed	  by	  telecommunications	  and	  information	  (ICT)	  technology	  and	  real	  estate.	  Figure	  4	  
outlines	  the	  performance	  of	  Nigeria’s	  oil	  and	  non-­‐oil	  GDP,	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  
former	  over	  the	  last	  year	  has	  on	  average	  lagged	  far	  behind	  that	  of	  the	  non-­‐oil	  based	  GDP,	  
mirroring	  depressed	  oil	  prices	  worldwide.	  The	  largest	  share	  in	  the	  agriculture	  sector	  is	  that	  
of	  crop	  production	  and	  livestock	  rearing	  is	  a	  distant	  second.	  
Table	  1:	  Share	  of	  some	  select	  sub-­‐sectors	  in	  GDP	  
Agriculture	   	  
Crop	  Production	  (of	  agriculture)	   86.80	  
Livestock	  (as	  above)	   8.90	  
Forestry	  (as	  above)	   0.14	  
Fishing	  (as	  above)	   3.00	  
Industry	   	  
Oil	  Refining	  (of	  industry)	   0.66	  
Cement	  (as	  above)	   3.50	  
Food,	  Beverage	  and	  Tobacco	  (as	  above)	   16.90	  
Textile,	  Apparel	  and	  Footwear	  (as	  above)	   8.80	  
Chemical	  and	  	  Pharmaceutical	  Products	  	  (as	  above)	   0.92	  
Construction	  (as	  above)	   16.90	  
Services	   	  
Trade	  (of	  services)	   32.90	  
Telecommunications	  &	  information	  services	  (as	  above)	   15.90	  
Real	  estate	  (as	  above)	   11.70	  
Professional,	  scientific	  and	  technical	  services	  (as	  above)	   6.40	  
Education	  (as	  above)	   3.80	  
Source:	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  
	   	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Nigeria:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
12	  
Figure	  4:	  Performance	  of	  oil	  and	  non-­‐oil	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  
2.1. The	  real	  contribution	  of	  oil	  to	  Nigerian	  GDP	  
Analysing	  the	  nature	  of	  structural	  change	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  economy	  is	  not	  the	  remit	  of	  this	  
paper.	  However,	  some	  direction	  on	  a	  possible	  growth	  trajectory	  would	  be	  apt	  given	  our	  
remit	  of	  devising	  anti-­‐corruption	  measures	  that	  increase	  productive	  and	  developmental	  
outcomes	  in	  the	  country.	  Oil	  still	  accounts	  for	  the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  government	  revenue	  
(close	  to	  70	  percent).	  Given	  that	  non-­‐oil	  GDP	  makes	  up	  90	  percent	  of	  total	  GDP,	  it	  is	  
apparent	  that	  other	  sectors	  are	  not	  taxed	  adequately	  enough,	  especially	  in	  the	  fast	  growing	  
services	  sector.	  Or	  put	  another	  way,	  oil	  and	  gas	  which	  make	  up	  only	  10	  percent	  of	  GDP,	  yet	  
according	  to	  latest	  figures	  account	  for	  70	  percent	  of	  government	  revenues.	  According	  to	  the	  
National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  the	  economy	  contracted	  by	  1.5	  percent	  in	  2016,	  and	  growth	  in	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both	  manufacturing	  and	  services	  declined.	  Low	  oil	  prices	  and	  a	  depreciating	  naira	  are	  likely	  
to	  contribute	  to	  a	  projected	  current	  account	  deficit	  of	  2.4	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  	  
One	  issue	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  looked	  at	  more	  closely	  is	  the	  contribution	  of	  oil	  to	  the	  country’s	  
GDP.	  Before	  the	  rebasing	  exercise	  the	  contribution	  of	  oil	  was	  much	  larger	  and	  it	  has	  since	  
been	  pared	  down	  to	  around	  10	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  As	  outlined	  earlier,	  this	  seems	  to	  suggest	  
that	  the	  economy	  has	  diversified,	  but	  two	  issues	  need	  to	  be	  interrogated	  further.	  Nigeria’s	  
per	  capita	  GDP	  has	  slid	  steeply	  since	  oil	  prices	  started	  falling	  from	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  2014.	  
This	  suggests	  GDP	  is	  linked	  much	  more	  strongly	  to	  oil	  than	  the	  figures	  suggest.	  Oil	  prices	  
have	  fallen	  by	  around	  50	  percent	  since	  2014.	  If	  the	  sector’s	  contribution	  to	  Nigerian	  GDP	  is	  
10	  percent	  per	  capita	  incomes	  should	  fall	  by	  5	  percent.	  The	  interesting	  observation	  is	  that	  
with	  World	  Bank	  figures	  Nigeria’s	  income	  has	  fallen	  by	  only	  3.7	  percent	  from	  2014	  (USD	  
2970)	  to	  2015	  (USD	  2820),	  using	  the	  Atlas	  Method	  and	  in	  current	  USD	  (World	  Bank,	  2017).	  
But	  if	  IMF	  figures	  are	  used	  the	  per	  capita	  income	  fell	  by	  16.8	  percent,	  from	  USD	  3268	  in	  2014	  
to	  USD	  2763	  in	  2015	  in	  nominal	  USD	  (IMF	  2016).	  Another	  way	  of	  testing	  the	  oil	  sector’s	  
actual	  contribution,	  one	  that	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  avoid	  the	  difference	  in	  figures	  from	  the	  two	  
IFIs,	  is	  to	  exclude	  the	  contribution	  of	  oil	  from	  Nigeria’s	  current	  per	  capita	  income.	  If	  this	  is	  
done	  then	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  for	  2015	  should	  be	  close	  to	  USD	  2500	  whether	  we	  take	  the	  
IMF	  or	  WB	  estimate.	  This	  figure	  is	  much	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  economies	  like	  Vietnam	  and	  
India,	  comparable	  LMICs	  who	  have	  high	  value	  added,	  export	  oriented	  manufacturing	  
sectors.	  Vietnam’s	  electronic	  sector	  is	  very	  well	  developed	  and	  in	  India’s	  case	  the	  textiles,	  
auto	  and	  auto	  components,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  manufacturing	  sectors	  are	  globally	  
competitive	  along	  with	  a	  high	  value	  added	  ICT	  sector.	  Nigeria	  has	  none	  of	  these	  types	  of	  
globally	  competitive	  manufacturing	  sectors	  nor	  does	  it	  have	  an	  export-­‐oriented	  sector	  like	  
garments	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bangladesh,	  which	  is	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  level	  of	  per	  capita	  income.	  	  
While	  this	  line	  of	  questioning	  needs	  detailed	  research,	  it	  does	  open	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  
recalculating	  the	  contribution	  of	  oil	  to	  GDP,	  when	  there	  are	  almost	  no	  other	  sectors	  making	  
significant	  contributions	  to	  GDP	  and	  when	  by	  at	  least	  one	  estimate	  per	  capita	  incomes	  have	  
fallen	  much	  more	  after	  the	  collapse	  in	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  than	  the	  sector’s	  share	  in	  GDP	  
suggests.	  One	  possible	  line	  of	  analysis	  is	  to	  see	  if	  unrecorded	  transfers	  from	  that	  sector	  
could	  be	  adding	  to	  sectoral	  incomes	  elsewhere.	  For	  instance	  public	  sector	  wages	  in	  Nigeria	  
are	  higher	  than	  those	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  There	  is	  scope	  for	  much	  opacity	  in	  Nigeria’s	  
federal	  budget	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  transfers	  are	  made	  and	  non-­‐oil	  revenues	  are	  transferred	  
across	  the	  economy.	  Value	  added	  taxes,	  corporate	  income	  tax,	  customs	  and	  excise	  duties	  
make	  up	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  country’s	  non-­‐oil	  budget,	  but	  'independent	  revenue'	  
seems	  much	  more	  discretionary,	  as	  it	  accrues	  to	  the	  federal	  government	  directly	  and	  
includes	  components	  like	  dividends	  and	  surpluses	  from	  state	  owned	  enterprises	  (Budget	  
Office	  of	  the	  Federation	  2014).	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  governments	  to	  make	  transfers	  from	  the	  oil	  
sector	  through	  these	  means,	  before	  income	  from	  the	  sector	  is	  taxed.	  Even	  if	  this	  does	  not	  
turn	  out	  to	  be	  wholly	  accurate	  the	  real	  extent	  of	  the	  oil	  sector’s	  contribution	  to	  GDP	  needs	  
to	  be	  better	  understood.	  Without	  this	  understanding	  policy	  design	  will	  miss	  the	  priorities	  
that	  need	  to	  be	  urgently	  addressed.	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2.2. Some	  recent	  policy	  developments	  in	  the	  economy	  
Since	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy,	  successive	  Nigerian	  governments	  have	  announced	  various	  
policy	  measures	  like	  the	  National	  Economic	  Empowerment	  and	  Development	  Strategy	  
(NEEDS)	  and	  the	  Seven	  Points	  Agenda,	  which	  led	  to	  some	  banking	  sector	  reforms	  but	  most	  
importantly	  the	  privatization	  of	  the	  telecom	  sector	  in	  2001.	  The	  ICT	  sector	  since	  then	  has	  
shown	  some	  signs	  of	  growth	  with	  multinational	  telecom	  providers	  like	  the	  South	  African	  
company	  MTN	  and	  the	  Indian	  company	  Airtel	  becoming	  established	  players.	  In	  2009	  the	  
government	  launched	  the	  Vision	  20:20	  industrialisation	  strategy,	  which	  finally	  led	  to	  the	  
Nigerian	  Industrial	  Revolution	  Plan	  (NIRP)	  2014.	  The	  NIRP	  focuses	  on	  four	  sectors	  (agro-­‐
allied,	  metals	  and	  solid	  minerals,	  oil	  and	  gas	  industrial	  activities	  and	  construction,	  light	  
manufacturing	  and	  services)	  and	  seven	  sub-­‐sectors.	  It	  is	  also	  supposed	  to	  be	  working	  with	  
other	  relevant	  agencies/ministries	  in	  the	  government	  like	  agriculture,	  oil	  and	  gas,	  solid	  
minerals	  and	  transport.	  However,	  given	  its	  diverse	  priorities	  and	  ambitious	  scope,	  the	  NIRP	  
has	  yet	  to	  have	  any	  significant	  impact	  except	  for	  announcing	  a	  few	  sector	  specific	  policies	  
like	  Nigerian	  Auto	  Industry	  Development	  Plan.	  The	  Agricultural	  Transformation	  Agenda	  
(ATA)	  of	  which	  the	  Growth	  Enhancement	  Scheme	  (GES)	  is	  a	  component	  was	  a	  special	  
package	  implemented	  for	  the	  agriculture	  sector,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  fertilisers	  
through	  e-­‐vouchers.	  Despite	  a	  few	  shortcomings	  the	  GES	  scheme	  has	  since	  been	  identified	  
as	  being	  successful	  in	  reducing	  supply	  leakages	  of	  fertilisers	  to	  farmers	  (Modupe	  2014;	  
Nwalieji	  2015;	  Fadairo	  et	  al	  2015).	  
At	  the	  sectoral	  level,	  in	  the	  last	  five	  years	  the	  earlier	  PDP	  government	  and	  incumbent	  APC	  
administration	  have	  made	  policy	  announcements	  targeting	  the	  oil	  and	  gas,	  power,	  textile,	  
fertiliser,	  auto	  and	  sugar	  sectors.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  among	  these	  has	  been	  the	  bill	  
to	  privatise	  and	  unbundle	  the	  Nigerian	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  (NNPC)	  which	  is	  
essentially	  the	  only	  organisation	  controlling	  the	  entire	  Nigerian	  oil	  industry.	  The	  Petroleum	  
Investment	  Bill,	  which	  has	  been	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  Senate	  for	  over	  ten	  years	  now,	  envisages	  
breaking	  up	  the	  NNPC	  into	  one	  regulating	  and	  two	  marketing	  companies	  or	  one	  regulator,	  
one	  marketing	  and	  one	  production	  company.	  The	  current	  administration	  had	  promised	  the	  
Bill’s	  passage	  by	  March	  2017,	  and	  it	  was	  finally	  passed	  in	  May	  2017.	  However,	  opposition	  to	  
it	  has	  already	  surfaced	  from	  various	  quarters,	  making	  its	  actual	  implementation	  a	  fraught	  
process.	  The	  new	  Regulatory	  body	  is	  also	  supposed	  to	  take	  over	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  current	  
Department	  of	  Petroleum	  Resources	  (DPR),	  the	  Petroleum	  Products	  Pricing	  Regulatory	  
Agency	  (PPPRA)	  and	  Petroleum	  Inspectorate	  (PI).	  However	  Nigerian	  and	  international	  media	  
reports	  have	  been	  speculating	  on	  whether	  Senators	  will	  be	  in	  agreement	  over	  the	  key	  
provisions	  of	  the	  bill	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  successfully	  passed	  (Vanguard	  2017;	  Reuters	  2017).	  	  
There	  is	  also	  significant	  opposition	  from	  the	  NNPC	  against	  unbundling,	  which	  will	  also	  lead	  to	  
limited	  privatization.	  The	  Buhari	  administration	  has	  tried	  to	  quell	  this	  by	  bringing	  in	  
members	  of	  the	  senior	  management	  from	  outside	  the	  NNPC.	  The	  Nigerian	  Local	  Content	  Bill,	  
passed	  in	  2010,	  was	  another	  significant	  industrial	  policy	  measure	  undertaken	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  
gas	  sector.	  It	  stated	  that	  independent	  Nigerian	  operators	  and	  service	  companies	  in	  the	  
sector	  would	  have	  to	  be	  given	  first	  right	  of	  refusal	  in	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  projects.	  However,	  
recent	  reports	  have	  outlined	  that	  there	  is	  limited	  uptake	  of	  the	  opportunities	  provided	  by	  
the	  act.	  While	  it	  has	  certainly	  helped	  a	  few	  legitimate	  and	  capable	  indigenous	  Nigerian	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Nigeria:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
15	  
companies,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  firms	  are	  actually	  fronts	  for	  foreign	  operators	  and	  this	  is	  a	  
direct	  contravention	  of	  the	  act	  (Nwapi	  2016).	  
A	  number	  of	  other	  policies	  in	  the	  agricultural	  and	  manufacturing	  sector	  were	  also	  targeted	  
at	  curbing	  imports	  and	  smuggling,	  especially	  in	  the	  rice,	  sugar	  and	  automotive	  sectors.	  Most	  
of	  these	  schemes	  were	  announced	  by	  the	  PDP	  administration	  under	  then	  president	  
Goodluck	  Jonathan.	  The	  sugar	  and	  rice	  policies	  included	  incentives	  for	  investors	  to	  invest	  in	  
backward	  linkages,	  like	  outgrower	  schemes	  supported	  by	  import	  bans.	  Rice	  growers	  have	  
also	  been	  given	  access	  to	  extra	  credit	  through	  the	  Anchor	  Borrower’s	  Programme	  (ABP).	  
Nigeria	  has	  one	  of	  the	  most	  porous	  borders	  in	  Western	  Africa	  and	  domestic	  production	  in	  
each	  of	  these	  three	  sectors	  has	  been	  affected	  by	  smuggling.	  The	  smuggling	  has	  also	  been	  
exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  high	  import	  tariffs	  have	  been	  a	  part	  of	  these	  domestic	  support	  
schemes.	  While	  Nigeria’s	  recent	  foreign	  exchange	  crisis	  does	  provide	  a	  logic	  for	  having	  high	  
import	  duties,	  the	  Nigerian	  state	  has	  little	  capacity	  to	  enforce	  these	  rules,	  whether	  through	  
monitoring	  if	  beneficiaries	  have	  made	  the	  backward	  linkages	  necessary	  to	  obtain	  import	  
licences,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  sugar,	  or	  by	  ensuring	  that	  Customs	  officials	  do	  not	  allow	  smuggling	  
if	  they	  are	  bribed.	  In	  the	  rice	  sector	  smuggling	  has	  led	  to	  prices	  crashing	  and	  the	  ABP	  is	  being	  
used	  by	  ‘political	  farmers’,	  intermediaries	  who	  use	  political	  connections	  to	  access	  loans	  or	  
vouchers	  and	  distribute	  these	  onwards	  for	  profit	  (Eagle	  online	  2017;	  The	  Nation	  Online	  
2017).	  
The	  Nigerian	  government	  has	  announced	  fiscal	  incentives	  like	  differential	  tariffs	  for	  the	  
automotive	  and	  auto	  components	  sector,	  but	  these	  also	  lead	  to	  significant	  corruption	  rather	  
than	  supporting	  targeted	  sectors.	  The	  impact	  of	  such	  corruption	  is	  on	  the	  growth	  of	  
competitiveness	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  automobile	  industry,	  and	  it	  also	  indirectly	  affects	  ancillary	  
industries	  and	  employment	  in	  these	  clusters	  and	  slows	  down	  economic	  diversification	  in	  
general.	  The	  current	  policy	  regime	  provides	  a	  high	  tariff	  on	  fully	  built	  up	  cars,	  while	  the	  
lowest	  tariffs	  are	  on	  completely	  knocked	  down	  (CKD)	  kits.	  This	  essentially	  means	  firms	  only	  
have	  to	  assemble	  imported	  parts,	  rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  source	  a	  few	  parts	  locally.	  This	  
policy	  benefits	  some	  assemblers	  and	  is	  sustained	  by	  collusion.	  The	  first	  and	  more	  visible	  
corruption	  problem	  in	  the	  automobile	  sector,	  driven	  by	  the	  tariff	  regime,	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  
smuggled	  second-­‐hand	  cars	  from	  Benin	  and	  Togo.	  	  
The	  second	  is	  a	  collusion	  problem,	  which	  is	  more	  subtle.	  The	  current	  policy	  emerged	  through	  
the	  close	  political	  links	  between	  a	  relatively	  new	  indigenous	  auto	  firm	  and	  members	  of	  the	  
former	  government	  of	  Goodluck	  Jonathan.	  The	  low	  tariffs	  on	  auto	  components	  were	  
beneficial	  for	  the	  individuals	  and	  companies	  involved,	  but	  damaging	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  automobile	  sector	  in	  Nigeria.	  The	  policy	  made	  the	  Nigerian	  auto	  sector	  dependent	  on	  
auto	  component	  imports,	  with	  little	  possibility	  of	  developing	  backward	  linkages	  in	  the	  
domestic	  economy.	  This	  policy	  also	  provides	  adverse	  incentives	  for	  moving	  into	  the	  
production	  of	  any	  components,	  as	  companies	  that	  import	  completely	  knocked	  down	  kits	  can	  
also	  import	  fully	  built	  up	  cars.	  This	  means	  companies	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  assemble	  CKDs	  
just	  to	  be	  able	  to	  import	  fully	  built	  up	  cars.	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  bringing	  down	  the	  tariffs	  to	  
deter	  smuggling	  (and	  increasing	  tariffs	  on	  selected	  auto	  components	  to	  support	  local	  
industry)	  might	  be	  a	  beneficial	  policy	  option	  given	  the	  state’s	  enforcement	  capabilities.	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The	  power	  sector	  has	  also	  seen	  significant	  reforms	  with	  the	  generation	  and	  distribution	  
sectors	  being	  completely	  privatised	  in	  the	  country.	  User	  subsidies	  have	  been	  abolished	  and	  
tariffs	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  cost	  reflective,	  though	  both	  industrial	  and	  residential	  end	  users	  
have	  opposed	  the	  tariffs	  for	  being	  prohibitively	  high.	  The	  government	  has	  refused	  to	  bring	  
down	  tariffs	  and	  power	  producers	  and	  distributors	  alike	  have	  simply	  been	  asked	  to	  use	  the	  
Nigerian	  Electricity	  Market	  Stabilisation	  Facility	  in	  case	  of	  capital	  shortfalls.	  This	  policy	  too	  
allows	  generators	  to	  access	  government	  support	  without	  necessarily	  delivering	  cheaper	  
electricity.	  The	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Nigeria	  is	  now	  being	  increasingly	  used	  for	  such	  sectoral	  
funding	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  design	  of	  the	  support	  requires	  a	  degree	  of	  regulatory	  
enforcement	  to	  achieve	  results	  that	  is	  currently	  not	  available	  in	  Nigeria.	  	  
The	  government	  has	  also	  just	  announced	  setting	  up	  the	  Development	  Bank	  of	  Nigeria	  with	  
USD	  1.3	  billion	  to	  fund	  micro	  and	  small	  and	  medium	  enterprises,	  which	  are	  said	  to	  
contribute	  close	  to	  48	  percent	  of	  GDP	  (Vanguard	  2015).	  For	  observers	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  
economy,	  government	  attempts	  at	  trying	  to	  revive	  the	  economy	  and	  diversify	  it	  have	  long	  
been	  visible.	  However,	  these	  have	  often	  stopped	  short	  in	  terms	  of	  implementation	  and	  for	  
not	  having	  the	  necessary	  governance	  support	  that	  could	  have	  ensured	  better	  results.	  Our	  
next	  section	  analyses	  the	  reasons	  for	  this,	  through	  our	  framework	  of	  political	  settlement	  
analysis:	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  that	  defines	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  enforcement	  capability	  of	  a	  
ruling	  coalition.	  This	  has	  implications	  for	  growth,	  stability	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  
relevant	  policy,	  and	  directs	  our	  attention	  towards	  policy	  formulation	  that	  can	  be	  feasibly	  
implemented	  in	  the	  existing	  political	  settlement.	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3. The	  political	  settlement	  and	  rent	  
seeking	  in	  Nigeria	  
A	  political	  settlement	  is	  a	  sustainable	  distribution	  of	  organisational	  power	  based	  on	  a	  mix	  of	  
formal	  and	  informal	  institutions	  that	  are	  supported	  by	  these	  organisations,	  and	  which	  
deliver	  benefits	  or	  ‘rents’	  to	  them.	  Informal	  institutions	  have	  long	  been	  accepted	  in	  the	  
literature	  as	  an	  important	  driver	  of	  growth	  and	  stability,	  but	  are	  also	  treated	  primarily	  as	  
culture	  in	  some	  sections	  of	  the	  literature	  (Williamson	  2000;	  North	  1995).	  However	  the	  
informality	  that	  concerns	  us	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  political	  settlements	  are	  the	  informal	  practices	  
and	  systematic	  violations	  of	  formal	  rules	  that	  create	  informal	  rents	  in	  developing	  countries	  
for	  powerful	  formal	  and	  informal	  organisations.	  Culture	  and	  social	  norms	  describe	  these	  
practices	  but	  the	  political	  settlements	  approach	  offers	  a	  systematic	  explanation	  of	  why	  some	  
types	  of	  social	  norms	  persist.	  	  
Developing	  countries	  do	  not	  have	  large	  productive	  economies	  and	  can	  be	  best	  be	  described	  
as	  pre-­‐	  or	  proto-­‐capitalist.	  They	  frequently	  have	  contested	  or	  overlapping	  structures	  of	  
property	  rights.	  Nigeria	  is	  no	  exception.	  As	  productive	  capabilities	  are	  weak,	  powerful	  
organisations	  in	  developing	  economies	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  large	  sources	  of	  formal	  income	  
(in	  the	  form	  of	  profits	  or	  formal	  subsidies	  based	  on	  taxes).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  ruling	  
coalition	  cannot	  redistribute	  sufficient	  income	  to	  their	  constituencies	  and	  supporters	  in	  
formal	  ways,	  based	  on	  the	  formal	  budget	  for	  health,	  education,	  or	  social	  security,	  as	  they	  
can	  in	  developed	  economies.	  Even	  though	  the	  allocation	  of	  formal	  budgetary	  resources	  is	  
becoming	  increasingly	  important	  in	  lower	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  like	  Nigeria,	  an	  
important	  segment	  of	  political	  redistribution	  to	  critical	  constituencies	  still	  has	  a	  large	  
informal	  component	  which	  comes	  from	  non-­‐productive,	  informal	  sources.	  	  
The	  question	  to	  address	  is	  how	  power	  is	  distributed	  both	  formally	  and	  informally,	  and	  how	  
this	  becomes	  a	  source	  of	  rents	  and	  a	  source	  of	  contestation	  over	  their	  distribution.	  The	  
distribution	  of	  rents	  within	  and	  between	  organisations	  is	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  understanding	  
their	  relative	  power.	  Political	  settlements	  can	  be	  classified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relative	  holding	  
power	  across	  organisations	  and	  across	  different	  levels	  of	  organisations	  (Khan	  2010).	  Political	  
corruption	  in	  Nigeria	  includes	  transfers	  from	  resource	  sectors,	  through	  privatisation	  to	  
cronies	  or	  the	  capture	  of	  subsidies.	  However,	  disrupting	  these	  flows	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  a	  
reduction	  in	  political	  stability	  if	  constituents	  or	  organisations	  who	  were	  recipients	  of	  these	  
benefits	  contest	  the	  disruption.	  If	  the	  organisations	  excluded	  from	  ruling	  coalitions	  are	  very	  
powerful,	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  inflict	  serious	  costs	  through	  blocking	  policies	  or	  even	  through	  
violent	  conflicts	  (Khan	  2010).	  	  This	  is	  why	  a	  mapping	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  and	  
identifying	  the	  rents	  generated	  within	  it	  is	  helpful	  both	  as	  a	  diagnostic	  and	  predictive	  tool	  
when	  devising	  policy	  solutions.	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3.1. How	  power	  was	  configured	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  
settlement	  
Box	  1:	  The	  Political	  Settlements	  Analysis	  (PSA)	  
The	  distribution	  of	  organisational	  power	  in	  a	  society	  (its	  political	  settlement)	  is	  an	  
important	  determinant	  of	  the	  policies	  and	  institutions	  that	  emerge	  and	  how	  effectively	  
they	  can	  be	  implemented.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  affects	  implementation	  because	  it	  
identifies	  the	  organisations	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  capture	  rents,	  if	  necessary	  by	  distorting	  
formal	  policies.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  across	  political	  organisations	  and	  within	  the	  
ruling	  coalition	  are	  both	  important.	  The	  capabilities	  of	  economic	  organisations	  and	  of	  
the	  bureaucracy	  (including	  the	  military)	  are	  also	  important	  components	  of	  the	  overall	  
configuration	  of	  power.	  However,	  the	  configuration	  of	  political	  power	  is	  particularly	  
important	  and	  we	  use	  the	  framework	  in	  Khan	  (2010)	  to	  describe	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  
political	  settlement	  as	  shown	  below.	  
	  
The	  configuration	  of	  power	  in	  the	  top	  left	  hand	  corner	  of	  the	  diagram	  describes	  
potential	  developmental	  coalitions	  where	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  faces	  weak	  opposition	  
from	  excluded	  groups	  and	  the	  leadership	  has	  effective	  power	  over	  their	  own	  
organisations.	  This	  combination	  results	  in	  long	  time	  horizons,	  as	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  is	  
not	  vulnerable	  and	  significant	  implementation	  capabilities	  as	  its	  lower	  levels	  can	  be	  
disciplined	  by	  higher	  levels.	  These	  coalitions	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  authoritarian	  but	  rarely	  











































































Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Nigeria:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
19	  
As	  excluded	  organisations	  become	  more	  powerful,	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  may	  have	  to	  use	  
more	  repression	  or	  violence	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  We	  then	  have	  the	  emergence	  of	  
vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalitions	  as	  we	  move	  towards	  the	  top	  right.	  These	  coalitions	  
have	  a	  shorter	  time	  horizon	  and	  the	  leadership	  engages	  in	  more	  unproductive	  rent	  
capture	  even	  if	  their	  control	  over	  their	  followers	  remains	  strong.	  
However,	  these	  ruling	  coalitions	  tend	  to	  lose	  control	  over	  lower	  levels	  because	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  control	  lower	  levels	  if	  powerful	  excluded	  organisations	  offer	  them	  better	  
deals.	  Parts	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  can	  begin	  to	  leave	  and	  build	  new	  organisations	  or	  join	  
the	  opposition	  hoping	  to	  get	  better	  deals.	  As	  multiple	  parties	  emerge,	  each	  party	  has	  
weaker	  control	  over	  their	  organisation	  because	  disaffected	  members	  can	  leave.	  We	  are	  
then	  in	  the	  bottom	  right	  hand	  corner	  described	  as	  competitive	  clientelism.	  This	  
configuration	  of	  power	  typically	  supports	  democratic	  competition	  in	  developing	  
countries.	  Democracy	  can	  be	  more	  stable	  and	  less	  repressive	  than	  a	  vulnerable	  
authoritarian	  coalition	  if	  organisational	  power	  has	  actually	  become	  fragmented,	  but	  
democratic	  parties	  also	  have	  short	  time	  horizons	  and	  weak	  implementation	  capacities.	  
If	  the	  competing	  parties	  can	  work	  out	  ‘live	  and	  let	  live’	  arrangements	  of	  replacing	  each	  
other	  in	  power,	  institutional	  and	  policy	  stability	  may	  emerge	  with	  good	  development	  
outcomes	  in	  some	  contexts.	  
Finally,	  a	  configuration	  of	  a	  large	  political	  organisation	  that	  faces	  limited	  opposition	  is	  the	  
weak	  dominant	  party	  in	  the	  bottom	  left	  hand	  corner.	  Such	  a	  ruling	  coalition	  may	  have	  
limited	  implementation	  capability	  because	  by	  including	  almost	  everyone	  the	  leadership	  
also	  pays	  the	  price	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  impose	  discipline	  on	  their	  own	  organisation.	  These	  
ideal	  types	  are	  simplifications	  and	  many	  examples	  lie	  on	  the	  boundaries	  of	  these	  
categories:	  for	  instance	  dominant	  parties	  with	  strong	  organisations	  can	  be	  close	  to	  being	  
developmental	  coalitions	  and	  developmental	  coalitions	  that	  face	  growing	  resistance	  can	  
become	  vulnerable	  authoritarianisms	  and	  so	  on	  (Khan	  2010).	  
Before	  moving	  onto	  different	  types	  of	  rents,	  Figure	  5	  below	  tracks	  changes	  in	  the	  
distribution	  of	  power	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  ruling	  coalitions	  in	  Nigeria.	  Two	  dimensions	  of	  
relative	  power	  are	  important	  for	  the	  allocation	  of	  political	  rents.	  One	  is	  the	  distribution	  of	  
power	  between	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  and	  organisations	  excluded	  from	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  The	  
second	  is	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  between	  higher	  and	  lower	  levels	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  
Most	  political	  organisations	  or	  socio-­‐political	  coalitions	  (like	  traditional	  kinship	  communities)	  
have	  a	  pyramidal	  structure,	  with	  support	  from	  below	  being	  exchanged	  for	  resources	  from	  
above.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  between	  higher	  and	  lower	  levels	  determines	  the	  
implementation	  capability	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  If	  lower	  levels	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  are	  
powerful	  they	  can	  capture	  resources	  without	  constraint	  (Khan	  2005).	  The	  typology	  above	  is	  
clearly	  simplified,	  and	  in	  reality	  political	  settlements	  have	  mixed	  characteristics,	  but	  it	  does	  
help	  to	  identify	  broad	  differences	  between	  ruling	  coalitions.	  In	  an	  ideal	  world	  a	  potential	  
developmental	  coalition	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  developmental	  outcome	  as	  such	  a	  ruling	  coalition	  
could	  implement	  policy	  without	  much	  opposition.	  A	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalition	  is	  one	  
where	  the	  lower	  levels	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  are	  weak	  but	  excluded	  organisations	  are	  strong	  
and	  repression	  has	  to	  be	  frequently	  used.	  The	  ruling	  coalition	  in	  Nigeria	  under	  Sani	  Abacha	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could	  be	  described	  in	  these	  terms,	  as	  his	  administration	  frequently	  resorted	  to	  repression.	  
The	  paradox	  about	  this	  variant	  is	  that	  as	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  gets	  weaker	  the	  regime	  tends	  to	  
be	  more	  insecure	  and	  use	  more	  violence	  to	  repress	  any	  opposition.	  The	  logic	  of	  this	  variant	  
is	  that	  the	  more	  repressive	  it	  becomes	  the	  more	  vulnerable	  is	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  	  
Figure	  5:	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Nigeria	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  Khan	  2010	  
Nigeria	  under	  PDP	  rule	  was	  closer	  in	  our	  typology	  to	  a	  weak	  dominant	  party,	  as	  rents	  were	  
captured	  by	  networks	  within	  the	  party	  and	  disciplining	  was	  neither	  possible,	  nor	  was	  there	  an	  
incentive	  to	  do	  so,	  as	  PDP	  leaders	  would	  not	  have	  risked	  alienating	  the	  constituencies	  
controlled	  by	  lower-­‐level	  leaders.	  The	  final	  variant	  is	  competitive	  clientelism	  where	  the	  ruling	  
coalition	  faces	  strong	  external	  coalitions	  and	  lower	  level	  networks	  are	  also	  strong.	  With	  this	  
configuration	  of	  power,	  authoritarianism	  is	  usually	  not	  an	  option	  and	  the	  only	  viable	  system	  
of	  government	  tends	  to	  be	  some	  form	  of	  democracy	  though	  it	  can	  be	  much	  contested	  with	  
high	  levels	  of	  violence,	  as	  is	  frequently	  the	  case	  in	  developing	  countries.	  This	  fragmentation	  
also	  results	  in	  a	  heightened	  need	  to	  include	  more	  networks	  in	  order	  to	  broaden	  the	  support	  
base,	  thus	  informal	  rent	  redistribution	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  widespread.	  In	  all	  these	  cases	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  developmental	  interventions	  depends	  on	  the	  allocation	  and	  management	  of	  
rents	  to	  achieve	  long-­‐term	  development,	  and	  this	  depends	  in	  large	  part	  on	  the	  
implementation	  capabilities	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  and	  its	  time	  horizon.	  Given	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  feasible	  governance	  forms	  in	  developing	  countries,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  explain	  
why	  corruption	  does	  not	  decline	  with	  conventional	  good	  governance	  strategies	  that	  often	  
prescribe	  democratisation	  as	  a	  way	  of	  tackling	  corruption.	  Competitive	  clientelism	  tends	  to	  
generate	  short	  time	  horizons	  and	  weak	  implementation	  capabilities,	  together	  with	  significant	  
informal	  rent	  capture.	  Yet,	  when	  power	  is	  configured	  in	  this	  way,	  democracy	  may	  result	  in	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repression	  to	  stay	  in	  place.	  Since	  2015	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  settlement	  seems	  to	  have	  moved	  
into	  a	  phase	  of	  tenuous	  competitive	  clientelism,	  with	  the	  PDP	  and	  APC	  becoming	  entrenched	  
in	  a	  face-­‐off	  with	  each	  other.	  As	  Figure	  6	  below	  shows	  the	  PDP	  is	  not	  a	  spent	  force	  and	  has	  
begun	  mobilising	  for	  the	  2019	  elections	  in	  earnest.	  A	  renewed	  two	  way	  contest	  between	  the	  
two	  is	  likely	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  2019,	  but	  the	  real	  contest	  will	  be	  between	  the	  mobilising	  
capabilities	  of	  the	  potential	  candidates	  rather	  than	  of	  the	  two	  parties.	  	  
Figure	  6:	  States	  won	  by	  the	  APC	  and	  PDP	  
	  
Source:	  http://oecdinsights.org/2015/04/10/nigeria-­‐is-­‐the-­‐winner-­‐west-­‐africa-­‐too/	  
These	  two	  parties	  currently	  represent	  a	  fair	  mix	  of	  the	  constituencies	  around	  which	  Nigerian	  
politics	  is	  organised—regional,	  ethnic	  and	  religious.	  Our	  analysis	  suggests	  concentrating	  on	  
these	  three	  factors	  separately	  while	  studying	  Nigerian	  development	  does	  not	  capture	  the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  country’s	  political	  economy.	  Nigeria’s	  main	  political	  parties	  are	  an	  
amalgam	  of	  all	  three	  constituencies,	  but	  these	  markers	  are	  not	  deployed	  in	  an	  additively	  
separable	  manner	  within	  the	  political	  parties.	  The	  PDP	  was	  until	  2015	  accepted	  and	  elected	  
as	  the	  only	  national	  party	  winning	  seats	  in	  the	  North	  and,	  despite	  being	  from	  the	  South	  
West,	  the	  first	  PDP	  President,	  Olusegun	  Obasanjo,	  a	  Yoruba	  and	  a	  Christian,	  was	  widely	  
accepted	  by	  voters	  in	  the	  mainly	  Muslim	  and	  Hausa	  North.	  He	  had	  also	  been	  a	  military	  ruler	  
from	  1973	  to	  1976.	  Yet	  one	  of	  northern	  (specifically	  north	  west)	  Nigeria’s	  most	  influential	  
organisations,	  the	  Katsina-­‐based	  People’s	  Democratic	  Movement,	  was	  instrumental	  in	  
garnering	  support	  for	  him	  in	  the	  North	  (Hoffman	  2014).	  This	  did	  not	  stop	  him	  from	  reaching	  
out	  to	  his	  own	  constituency	  in	  the	  South	  West	  over	  Northern	  interests.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  PDP	  
that	  started	  the	  informal	  practice	  of	  ‘zoning’	  that	  ensures	  each	  of	  the	  six	  geo-­‐political	  
regions	  in	  the	  country	  holds	  each	  important	  post	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  by	  rotation.	  	  
The	  APC	  was	  formed	  with	  the	  merger	  of	  the	  All	  Nigeria	  Peoples	  Party,	  Congress	  for	  Progressive	  
Change,	  Action	  Congress	  of	  Nigeria,	  and	  a	  faction	  of	  the	  All	  Progressives	  Grand	  Alliance	  in	  
2013.	  The	  first	  two	  are	  Northern	  parties	  and	  the	  latter	  are	  from	  the	  South	  West	  and	  South	  
East	  respectively.	  It	  incorporates	  Yoruba	  and	  Hausa	  Fulani	  leadership	  as	  well	  as	  Muslims	  and	  
Christians.	  An	  online	  article	  analysing	  the	  APC	  called	  it	  a	  ‘big	  tent’	  (New	  African	  2014)	  and	  this	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Nigeria:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
22	  
is	  what	  many	  political	  parties	  tend	  to	  be—weak	  dominant	  parties	  that	  tend	  to	  fragment	  in	  a	  
context	  of	  competitive	  clientelism.	  Several	  northern	  leaders	  crossed	  over	  from	  the	  PDP	  into	  
the	  APC	  while	  the	  current	  Vice-­‐President	  (and	  acting	  President	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing)	  is	  from	  
the	  South	  West.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  identities	  are	  not	  important	  but,	  as	  pointed	  out	  before,	  
they	  are	  used	  as	  tools	  for	  mobilisation	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  two	  political	  parties	  are	  
becoming	  more	  broad-­‐based	  with	  representation	  across	  the	  country	  (Katsina	  2016;	  New	  
African	  2014).	  Goodluck	  Jonathan	  who	  became	  the	  first	  incumbent	  president	  to	  lose	  power	  in	  
Nigeria	  was	  relatively	  more	  partisan,	  and	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  behind	  his	  defeat,	  apart	  
from	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption	  perceived,	  anecdotal	  and	  real,	  in	  his	  government.	  	  
Nigeria’s	  socio-­‐political	  structure	  is	  not	  just	  made	  up	  of	  the	  three	  main	  ethnic	  groups	  of	  
Hausa	  Fulani,	  Yoruba	  and	  Igbo,	  but	  also	  includes	  powerful	  minority	  groups	  like	  the	  Ijaw	  and	  
the	  Kanuri.	  Other	  smaller	  communities,	  like	  the	  Tiv	  in	  Benue,	  or	  the	  Ibibio	  in	  Akwa	  Ibom,	  are	  
politically	  powerful	  as	  they	  control	  these	  states	  despite	  making	  up	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  
Nigeria’s	  population	  (2	  to	  3	  percent).	  Equally	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  make	  up	  significant	  
minorities	  in	  the	  predominantly	  Muslim	  North	  and	  Christian	  South	  respectively.	  There	  are	  
also	  overlapping	  structures	  of	  power	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  Nigeria,	  where	  traditional	  leadership	  
roles	  overlap	  with	  post-­‐independence	  governance	  structures.	  This	  is	  a	  holdover	  from	  
colonial	  times,	  where	  the	  British	  chose	  not	  to	  overturn	  traditional	  authority	  but	  work	  with	  
them	  or	  co-­‐opt	  them.	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  more	  apparent	  than	  in	  the	  Hausa	  Fulani	  areas	  of	  
northern	  Nigeria	  where	  the	  emirs	  have	  since	  1999	  been	  indirectly	  part	  of	  governance	  efforts	  
(Hoffman	  2014).	  Traditional	  leaders	  have	  sometimes	  also	  been	  used	  as	  arbiters	  in	  times	  of	  
violence	  between	  the	  two	  communities	  (USAID	  2014).	  
Ethnic	  and	  religious	  violence	  are	  no	  doubt	  a	  disturbing	  feature	  of	  Nigerian	  politics.	  It	  does	  
not	  however,	  yet	  have	  the	  ideological	  nature	  of	  social	  and	  religious	  violence	  in	  India,	  
another	  society	  with	  multiple	  religious,	  linguistic	  and	  other	  identities	  based	  on	  social	  strata	  
(caste).	  While	  violence	  for	  any	  reason	  is	  unacceptable,	  the	  violence	  in	  Nigeria	  can	  still	  largely	  
be	  attributed	  to	  a	  competition	  for	  rents,	  where	  violence	  is	  used	  to	  establish	  relative	  holding	  
power	  given	  the	  evenly	  balanced	  distribution	  of	  power	  among	  the	  main	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  
groups.	  Frequent	  violence	  in	  Plateau	  states	  or	  in	  some	  northern	  states	  has	  more	  to	  with	  a	  
clash	  between	  ‘indigene’	  and	  ‘settler’	  rights,	  rather	  than	  an	  ideological	  battle	  between	  
Muslims	  and	  Christians.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  violence	  in	  India	  against	  social	  and	  ethnic	  minorities	  by	  Hindu	  majoritarian	  
parties	  aims	  to	  reinforce	  their	  already	  asymmetric	  holding	  power,	  given	  that	  the	  Hindu	  
community	  has	  an	  outright	  majority	  in	  the	  country	  (Roy	  2013).	  The	  differences	  in	  federal	  
structures	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  also	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	  how	  violence	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
tool	  to	  establish	  holding	  power.	  In	  Nigeria	  the	  police	  forces	  are	  directly	  under	  the	  federal	  
government.	  In	  India	  the	  police,	  and	  the	  state	  branch	  of	  the	  Intelligence	  Bureau	  (IB),	  are	  
under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  chief	  minister	  in	  every	  state,	  giving	  her	  or	  him	  power	  over	  state	  
level	  politics	  that	  even	  the	  prime	  minster	  does	  not	  have.	  The	  police	  and	  IB	  are	  often	  
politicised	  in	  India,	  and	  work	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  politicians	  in	  power	  at	  the	  state	  level	  and	  this	  
has	  a	  bearing	  on	  how	  violence	  is	  used	  as	  a	  political	  tool.	  This	  also	  makes	  elected	  Indian	  chief	  
ministers	  extremely	  powerful,	  making	  India’s	  federal	  structure	  very	  different	  from	  Nigeria’s	  
presidential	  federalism.	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Given	  Nigeria’s	  federal	  structure	  (36	  states	  and	  774	  local	  government	  councils),	  the	  scope	  
for	  programmatic	  clientelist	  politics	  is	  quite	  high.	  Local	  governments	  (through	  state	  
governments)	  control	  primary	  and	  vocational	  education,	  primary	  health	  care	  and,	  among	  
other	  areas,	  have	  joint	  authority	  over	  roads	  and	  transportation	  along	  with	  states	  (Figure	  7).	  
Local	  government	  expenditure	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  total	  government	  expenditure	  is	  20.6	  
percent.	  The	  funds	  are	  deposited	  in	  each	  State	  Joint	  Local	  Government	  (LG)	  account,	  which	  
is	  under	  the	  state’s	  control	  and	  the	  state	  governor	  decides	  when	  and	  how	  much	  the	  local	  
governments	  receive.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  reason,	  however,	  why	  governors	  of	  states	  can	  often	  be	  
in	  opposition	  to	  elected	  local	  councils,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  unknown	  for	  governors	  to	  dismiss	  elected	  
councils	  to	  appoint	  their	  own	  local	  commissions.	  Elections	  or	  the	  lack	  of	  them	  can	  be	  points	  
of	  contestation	  (This	  Day	  2016;	  Premium	  Times	  2017).	  Also	  over	  half	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  states	  
do	  not	  currently	  have	  elected	  local	  governments.	  Anecdotal	  evidence	  suggests	  one	  reason	  
for	  these	  contestations	  is	  the	  quantum	  of	  federal	  funds	  that	  local	  governments	  have	  access	  
to,	  and	  which	  state	  governors	  do	  not	  want	  to	  relinquish	  control	  over.	  	  
Given	  the	  sectors	  local	  governments	  have	  primary	  responsibility	  for,	  the	  scope	  for	  
redistributive	  politics	  affecting	  programmes	  is	  high.	  The	  derivative	  principle	  that	  governs	  the	  
percentage	  of	  oil	  revenues	  that	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  oil	  producing	  states	  (currently	  13	  percent),	  
also	  creates	  some	  redistributive	  tension	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  state/local	  governments	  
(Hoffman	  2014;	  Idemudia	  2012).	  In	  addition,	  a	  key	  concern	  for	  policy-­‐makers,	  donors	  and	  
civil	  society	  is	  the	  opacity	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  budget.	  The	  country	  ranks	  a	  very	  low	  24	  out	  of	  a	  
possible	  100	  on	  the	  Open	  Budget	  Index,	  which	  is	  far	  lower	  than	  the	  global	  average	  of	  45.	  
Questions	  about	  increasing	  fiscal	  federalism	  have	  been	  raised,	  as	  have	  been	  issues	  to	  do	  
with	  the	  national	  consensus	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  budget	  (through	  the	  Appropriations	  
Bill).	  The	  management	  of	  the	  budgetary	  process	  and	  the	  impact	  it	  has	  on	  monthly	  federal	  
allocations	  to	  states	  remain	  contested	  issues.	  These	  are	  areas	  that	  further	  research	  on	  
governance	  in	  Nigeria	  could	  gainfully	  focus	  on.	  
Apart	  from	  entirely	  informal	  resource	  allocations,	  the	  actual	  allocations	  of	  formal	  budgetary	  
programmes	  can	  be	  informally	  distorted	  by	  the	  underlying	  politics	  determining	  the	  identity	  
of	  beneficiaries.	  Patron-­‐client	  interactions	  in	  developing	  countries	  can	  take	  place	  through	  
both	  the	  implementation	  of	  formal	  programmes,	  as	  well	  as	  entirely	  informal	  allocations.	  In	  
some	  cases	  local	  communities	  or	  associations	  may	  not	  support	  the	  local	  government	  or	  may	  
be	  excluded	  by	  the	  latter,	  and	  they	  can	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  federal	  government	  directly.	  When	  
this	  is	  attempted	  such	  associations	  normally	  lose	  out	  as	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  too	  far	  
removed	  and	  the	  local	  government	  takes	  no	  interest	  in	  a	  constituency	  that	  does	  not	  support	  
it	  politically.	  This	  has	  negative	  consequences,	  especially	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  informal	  
production	  clusters	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  employment	  creating,	  as	  these	  often	  find	  it	  
difficult	  to	  align	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  local	  politicians	  (Meagher	  2014,	  2013).	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Figure	  7:	  Division	  of	  responsibilities	  between	  tiers	  of	  government	  
Services	   Delivering	  authority	  
	   Central	   States	   Local	  
GENERAL	  ADMINISTRATION	   	   	   	  
Police	   ■	   	   	  
Fire	  protection	   ■	   ■	   	  
Civil	  protection	   ■	   	   	  
Criminal	  justice	   ■	   ■	   	  
Civil	  status	  register	   	   	   ■	  
Statistical	  office	   ■	   ■	   	  
Electoral	  register	   ■	   ■	   	  
EDUCATION	   	   	   	  
Pre-­‐school	  (kindergarten	  &	  nursery)	   	   	   ■	  
Primary	   	   ■	   ■	  
Secondary	   ■	   ■	   	  
Vocational	  &	  technical	   	   ■	   	  
Higher	  education	   ■	   ■	   	  
Adult	  education	   	   ■	   ■	  
SOCIAL	  WELFARE	   	   	   	  
Family	  welfare	  services	   	   	   	  
Welfare	  homes	   	   ■	   	  
Social	  security	   	   	   	  
PUBLIC	  HEALTH	   	   	   	  
Primary	  care	   	   	   ■	  
Hospitals	   ■	   ■	   	  
Health	  protection	   	   	   ■	  
HOUSING	  &	  TOWN	  PLANNING	   	   	   	  
Housing	   ■	   ■	   	  
Town	  planning	   	   ■	   ■	  
Regional	  planning	   	   ■	   ■	  
TRANSPORT	   	   	   	  
Roads	   ■	   ■	   ■	  
Transport	   ■	   ■	   ■	  
Urban	  roads	   ■	   ■	   	  
Urban	  rail	   ■	   	   	  
Ports	   ■	   	   	  
Airports	   ■	   	   	  
ENVIRONMENT	  &	  PUBLIC	  SANITATION	   	   	   	  
Water	  &	  sanitation	   	   ■	   ■	  
Refuse	  collection	  &	  disposal	   	   	   ■	  
Cemeteries	  &	  crematoria	   	   	   ■	  
Slaughterhouses	   	   	   ■	  
Environmental	  protection	   	   ■	   ■	  
Consumer	  protection	   ■	   ■	   	  
CULTURE,	  LEISURE	  &	  SPORTS	   	   	   	  
Theatre	  &	  concerts	   ■	   ■	   	  
Museums	  &	  libraries	   ■	   ■	   	  
Parks	  &	  open	  spaces	   	   	   ■	  
Sports	  &	  leisure	   ■	   ■	   ■	  
Religious	  facilities	   ■	   ■	   ■	  
UTILITIES	   	   	   	  
Gas	  services	  	   	   	   	  
District	  heating	   	   	   	  
Water	  supply	   	   ■	   	  
Electricity	   ■	   	   	  
ECONOMIC	   	   	   	  
Agriculture,	  forests	  &	  fisheries	   ■	   	   	  
Local	  economic	  development/promotion	   ■	   	   	  
Trade	  &	  industry	   ■	   ■	   	  
Tourism	   ■	   ■	   	  
Source:	  Commonwealth	  Local	  Government	  Forum	  
■ Sole	  responsibility	  service	  	  	  	  ■ Joint	  responsibility	  service	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3.2. Types	  of	  rent	  seeking	  in	  Nigeria	  
Given	  the	  federal	  structure	  described	  above,	  political	  corruption	  is	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  rent	  
seeking	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  settlement.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  political	  corruption	  creates	  
rents	  for	  those	  within	  political	  organisations,	  including	  their	  supporters	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  
pyramid,	  for	  instance	  though	  targeted	  programmatic	  spending	  which	  is	  legal,	  or	  informal	  
modifications	  of	  legal	  programmes,	  or	  through	  entirely	  informal	  transfers	  at	  local	  levels	  for	  
village	  communities.	  	  These	  decisions	  are	  made	  by	  political	  entrepreneurs	  to	  create	  and	  
maintain	  political	  power	  and	  need	  not	  always	  be	  damaging,	  once	  we	  account	  for	  the	  
redistributive	  and	  stability-­‐inducing	  characteristics.	  But	  such	  allocations	  can	  also	  create	  
tensions	  and	  conflict	  and	  have	  adverse	  redistributive	  consequences	  if	  rents	  are	  created	  for	  
powerful	  (and	  rich)	  supporters	  who	  in	  return	  support	  the	  political	  leadership	  (Khan	  2009).	  
Some	  of	  these	  rents	  could	  also	  be	  policy	  support	  or	  subsidies	  to	  emerging	  businesses.	  If	  
allocated	  in	  certain	  ways,	  these	  rents	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  welfare	  enhancing,	  and	  can	  
induce	  productivity	  growth	  by	  helping	  firms	  to	  become	  more	  competitive.	  But	  if	  the	  
allocation,	  incentives	  and	  management	  of	  the	  rents	  are	  inappropriate,	  they	  can	  reduce	  social	  
welfare.	  These	  types	  of	  rent	  capture	  can	  be	  described	  as	  policy	  distorting	  corruption,	  and	  
can	  frequently	  overlap	  with	  political	  corruption.	  Distinctions	  between	  types	  of	  rents	  and	  rent	  
seeking	  are	  provided	  in	  Khan	  (2009)	  and	  Khan	  et	  al	  (2017).	  
Policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  can	  still	  be	  good	  for	  welfare	  and	  growth	  if,	  despite	  any	  
distortions,	  these	  discretionary	  allocations	  have	  net	  beneficial	  effects.	  This	  is	  possible,	  and	  
we	  often	  see	  this	  in	  developing	  countries,	  where	  corruption	  that	  distorts	  some	  policies	  still	  
allows	  positive	  outcomes	  provided	  the	  distortion	  is	  not	  too	  serious.	  But	  if	  the	  distortion	  
crosses	  a	  limit,	  the	  outcomes	  are	  negative.	  For	  instance,	  rent	  capture	  can	  sometimes	  allow	  
‘infant’	  firms	  to	  emerge	  and	  grow,	  and	  productive	  capitalists	  have	  often	  emerged	  in	  this	  
manner,	  including	  in	  Nigeria.	  More	  problematic	  is	  the	  situation	  where	  unproductive	  firms	  
capture	  the	  rent,	  but	  they	  are	  linked	  with	  powerful	  constituencies	  so	  that	  they	  are	  difficult	  
to	  discipline	  without	  upsetting	  political	  stability.	  Similarly,	  some	  corruption	  around	  road	  
building	  can	  still	  allow	  a	  road	  to	  be	  built,	  and	  the	  corruption	  may	  support	  the	  political	  
allocations	  that	  reduce	  local	  resistance	  to	  the	  road-­‐building	  programme.	  But	  beyond	  a	  point,	  
corruption	  can	  result	  in	  no	  road	  being	  built,	  or	  a	  road	  that	  gets	  washed	  away	  in	  the	  next	  
rainy	  season.	  These	  links	  between	  policy-­‐distortion	  and	  political	  considerations	  make	  the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  corruption	  far	  from	  simple.	  	  
Nigerian	  firms	  straddle	  the	  spectrum	  in	  terms	  of	  productivity	  and	  political	  connections	  and	  
there	  is	  evidence	  of	  both	  policy	  distorting	  and	  political	  corruption,	  alongside	  firms	  who	  have	  
now	  emerged	  as	  successful.	  The	  Dangote	  Group	  headed	  by	  Aliko	  Dangote	  is	  one	  such	  
successful	  firm	  that	  is	  today	  a	  conglomerate	  and	  often	  linked	  with	  high	  politics	  in	  Nigeria.	  It	  
is	  no	  longer	  just	  a	  West	  African	  player	  but	  has	  multiple	  business	  interests	  (cement,	  sugar,	  
fertiliser,	  oil	  refining,	  telecommunication,	  construction	  among	  many)	  across	  the	  continent.	  
Some	  reports	  suggest	  that	  he	  was	  close	  to	  the	  former	  presidents	  from	  the	  PDP,	  Obasanjo	  
and	  Jonathan	  (Forbes	  2015).	  Whatever	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  links,	  he	  used	  them	  to	  grow	  his	  
business	  in	  productive	  directions	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  the	  first	  Nigerian	  in	  the	  private	  
sector	  to	  operate	  an	  oil	  refinery,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  three	  public	  sector	  refineries	  are	  
operating	  way	  below	  capacity.	  Given	  his	  standing	  as	  a	  successful	  entrepreneur	  capable	  of	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investing	  in	  critical	  sectors	  and	  providing	  employment,	  ministers	  from	  the	  APC	  government	  
have	  shown	  no	  hesitation	  in	  sharing	  platforms	  with	  him	  and	  encouraging	  his	  investments,	  
despite	  his	  political	  affiliations.	  	  
While	  Dangote	  is	  the	  only	  Nigerian	  entrepreneur	  who	  operates	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  successfully	  
spans	  the	  entire	  African	  continent,	  the	  growing	  Nigerian	  economy	  has	  helped	  create	  
entrepreneurs	  who	  are	  beginning	  to	  make	  a	  significant	  contribution.	  Political	  connections,	  
deals	  and	  involvement	  in	  sectors	  like	  oil,	  real	  estate,	  telecommunications	  and	  financial	  
services	  that	  tend	  to	  be	  non-­‐tradable	  and	  oligopolistic,	  and	  hence	  provide	  scope	  for	  rent	  
capture,	  have	  usually	  been	  the	  opportunities	  that	  successful	  Nigerian	  businessmen	  have	  
used	  to	  move	  into	  more	  productive	  areas.	  These	  off-­‐market	  origins,	  however,	  mirror	  a	  
trajectory	  for	  businessmen	  across	  emerging	  economies,	  where	  collusion	  with	  the	  political	  
leadership	  is	  often	  the	  norm	  for	  businessmen	  (Khan	  2009,	  2010).	  Nigeria	  is	  no	  exception.	  A	  
significant	  number	  have	  been	  able	  to	  make	  use	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  Nigeria’s	  oil	  and	  gas	  
sector,	  through	  onshore	  exploration	  and	  IT	  services,	  to	  build	  profitable	  enterprises	  that	  are	  
now	  diversifying.	  Examples	  of	  such	  entrepreneurs	  are	  ABC	  Orjiako,	  Femi	  Otedola,	  Sam	  
Iwuajoku,	  Arthur	  Eze,	  Aderemi	  Maknjuola	  and	  Wale	  Tinubu.	  Others	  like	  Leonard	  Ekeh	  is	  one	  
of	  Nigeria’s	  successful	  IT	  entrepreneurs.	  Innoson	  Chukwuma	  is	  an	  entrepreneur	  who	  has	  
started	  auto-­‐assembly	  operations	  in	  Nigeria,	  but	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  if	  he	  can	  help	  foster	  a	  
Nigerian	  auto	  industry	  (the	  reasons	  for	  which	  have	  been	  outlined	  in	  section	  2).	  Despite	  the	  
success	  of	  these	  entrepreneurs,	  the	  need	  for	  enforcement	  and	  discipline	  remains	  if	  the	  state	  
is	  to	  direct	  the	  economy	  into	  more	  broad	  based	  inclusive	  sectors.	  	  
The	  private	  sector	  has	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Nigeria’s	  growth,	  and	  the	  state	  too	  needs	  
to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  as	  a	  facilitator.	  Nigeria’s	  trajectory	  towards	  competitive	  clientelism	  
suggests	  this	  is	  going	  to	  be	  increasingly	  difficult,	  as	  businessmen	  are	  likely	  to	  become	  more	  
powerful	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  the	  state.	  Given	  that	  patron-­‐client	  relationships	  can	  vary	  across	  a	  
continuum,	  increasing	  fragmentation	  among	  the	  political	  elite	  can	  sometimes	  lead	  to	  a	  
situation	  of	  a	  reversal	  of	  patron-­‐client	  relationships,	  where	  powerful	  business	  interests	  can	  
capture	  certain	  policies	  and	  politicians,	  and	  direct	  them	  for	  their	  own	  benefit	  (Roy	  2013).	  
Some	  parameters	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  could	  then	  start	  being	  set	  by	  economic	  
organisations.	  There	  is	  evidence	  of	  this	  in	  at	  least	  some	  sectors	  in	  Nigeria,	  like	  oil.	  At	  the	  
extreme	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  lies	  state	  capture	  by	  crony	  capitalists,	  but	  given	  the	  multiplicity	  
of	  powerful	  political	  organisations	  in	  Nigeria	  this	  is	  unlikely	  to	  happen.	  A	  feasible	  scenario	  
would	  entail	  the	  main	  political	  parties	  reaching	  a	  'live	  and	  let	  live'	  solution	  that	  works	  at	  two	  
levels—pre-­‐empting	  ‘businesses’	  from	  capturing	  the	  parties	  and	  gaining	  untrammelled	  access	  
to	  rents,	  and	  also	  providing	  productive	  businesses	  with	  a	  credible	  commitment	  that	  their	  
investments	  will	  not	  be	  appropriated	  irrespective	  of	  the	  party	  in	  power.	  An	  emerging	  area	  of	  
cooperation	  (and	  future	  research)	  between	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  
in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  former	  is	  getting	  involved	  in	  conflict	  resolution.	  For	  instance	  Dangote	  is	  
involved	  in	  some	  conflict-­‐resolution	  activities	  in	  the	  North	  East,	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  
similar	  model	  being	  adopted	  in	  the	  conflict	  affected	  areas	  of	  the	  Middle	  Belt	  and	  the	  South.	  	  	  
Just	  as	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  can	  be	  closely	  tied	  to	  political	  corruption,	  political	  
corruption	  can	  lead	  to	  predatory	  corruption	  in	  certain	  sectors.	  In	  this	  case	  rent-­‐seeking	  is	  
always	  damaging,	  because	  powerful	  leaders	  seek	  resources	  to	  maintain	  their	  constituencies	  
including	  in	  some	  cases,	  militias	  or	  the	  military.	  They	  then	  use	  these	  bases	  of	  power	  to	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capture	  further	  rents,	  which	  may	  be	  critically	  damaging	  for	  society.	  Hence,	  unlike	  the	  other	  
types	  of	  corruption,	  predatory	  corruption	  is	  always	  damaging.	  A	  state	  that	  is	  characterised	  
primarily	  by	  predatory	  rent	  seeking	  is	  a	  failed	  state,	  but	  that	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  case	  in	  
Nigeria.	  There	  are	  certain	  sectors	  and	  sections	  of	  society	  where	  rent	  seeking	  is	  dangerously	  
close	  to	  being	  predatory	  or	  is	  already	  so,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  corruption	  of	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  
how	  Nigerian	  society	  works.	  Some	  forms	  of	  policy-­‐distorting	  or	  political	  corruption	  can	  
however	  collapse	  into	  predatory	  corruption,	  if	  powerful	  politicians	  or	  businessmen	  engage	  
in	  theft	  of	  public	  resources.	  	  
However	  predatory	  corruption	  can	  become	  the	  dominant	  form	  of	  corruption	  when	  state	  
failure	  leads	  to	  spirals	  of	  violence.	  The	  recently	  renewed	  violence	  in	  the	  oil-­‐rich	  Niger	  Delta,	  
by	  a	  group	  called	  the	  Niger	  Delta	  Avengers,	  is	  apparently	  being	  conducted	  with	  some	  local	  
official	  collusion.	  A	  recent	  spurt	  in	  clashes	  between	  armed	  Fulani	  herders	  and	  pastoralists	  in	  
the	  North	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	  the	  support	  of	  some	  local	  politicians	  too	  (Ynaija	  2017).	  Other	  
reports	  suggest	  funds	  meant	  to	  buy	  arms	  to	  combat	  Boko	  Haram	  in	  the	  north	  east	  have	  
been	  siphoned	  off	  by	  political	  leaders	  (Voice	  of	  America	  2014).	  While	  official	  investigations	  
have	  unearthed	  some	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  allegation	  of	  a	  diversion	  of	  the	  arms	  fund	  in	  
the	  north	  east,	  the	  other	  two	  claims	  are	  not	  as	  well	  substantiated.	  However	  the	  presence	  of	  
persistent	  violence	  does	  suggest	  predation	  and	  the	  capture	  of	  some	  state	  machinery,	  given	  
the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  breakdown	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  clarified	  that	  
sometimes	  the	  grievances	  that	  lead	  to	  violence	  are	  real,	  and	  the	  complexities	  behind	  them	  
are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
A	  less	  damaging	  instance	  of	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption,	  that	  has	  elements	  of	  political	  
corruption	  and	  can	  collapse	  into	  predatory	  theft,	  is	  the	  case	  of	  smuggling	  in	  Nigeria.	  Recent	  
estimates	  have	  shown	  that	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  consignments	  arriving	  in	  a	  Benin	  terminal	  
facility	  were	  meant	  for	  Nigeria	  (according	  to	  the	  IMF	  Benin	  records	  Nigeria-­‐bound	  imports	  as	  
meant	  for	  consumption	  domestically).	  But	  just	  over	  10	  percent	  of	  the	  value	  of	  these	  goods	  
were	  officially	  declared	  as	  goods	  that	  were	  transiting	  to	  Nigeria	  when	  they	  arrived	  in	  Benin	  
(Hoffman	  and	  Melly	  2015).	  Nigeria	  is	  known	  to	  have	  some	  of	  the	  most	  porous	  borders	  in	  
Africa	  and	  collusion	  with	  customs	  authorities	  is	  endemic	  (Hoffman	  and	  Melly	  2015).	  This	  is	  
not	  just	  a	  problem	  of	  revenue	  collection	  for	  the	  Nigerian	  government,	  but	  has	  a	  knock-­‐on	  
effect	  in	  terms	  of	  swamping	  the	  Nigerian	  market	  with	  goods	  that	  do	  not	  pay	  taxes	  or	  duties,	  
ranging	  from	  sugar,	  rice	  (even	  supposedly	  fake	  plastic	  rice),	  cars,	  diesel,	  textiles	  and	  
electronics,	  that	  ensure	  local	  industry	  has	  very	  little	  chance	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
countervailing	  policies.	  	  
Indeed	  smuggling	  could	  even	  be	  more	  damaging	  than	  the	  lack	  of	  electricity,	  or	  certainly	  as	  
damaging,	  given	  the	  low	  initial	  competitiveness	  of	  Nigerian	  industry.	  One	  reason	  for	  
smuggling	  is	  the	  excessive	  ‘red	  tape’,	  or	  bureaucratic	  procedures	  that	  traders	  and	  exporters	  
face	  (Hoffman	  and	  Melly	  2015).	  These	  market	  restrictions	  drive	  a	  form	  of	  corruption	  that	  we	  
describe	  as	  market	  restriction-­‐driven	  corruption.	  Importers	  have	  to	  resort	  to	  bribing	  
officials	  to	  ease	  the	  flow	  of	  transactions.	  However,	  this	  corruption	  is	  also	  driven	  by	  
politicians	  who	  deliberately	  create	  restrictions	  to	  raise	  political	  funds	  (political	  corruption)	  
and	  sometimes	  descends	  into	  predatory	  corruption	  when	  state	  officials	  and	  powerful	  
traders	  collude	  to	  steal	  resources.	  More	  instances	  of	  the	  interdependence	  of	  different	  types	  
of	  corruption	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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3.3. A	  possible	  future	  trajectory	  for	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  
settlement	  
With	  presidential	  elections	  due	  in	  the	  next	  two	  years,	  observers	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  
economy	  are	  expecting	  these	  elections	  to	  be	  even	  more	  keenly	  contested	  than	  those	  in	  
2015,	  where	  four	  regional	  parties	  came	  together	  to	  form	  the	  APC	  and	  take	  on	  the	  
established	  might	  of	  the	  PDP.	  While	  the	  PDP	  was	  the	  only	  national	  party	  that	  won	  from	  1999	  
onwards,	  it	  was	  not	  that	  there	  were	  no	  opposition	  parties	  in	  Nigeria	  during	  this	  period.	  It	  
was	  successful	  mainly	  for	  three	  reasons.	  It	  was	  an	  inclusive	  party	  (a	  weak	  dominant	  party)	  
that	  managed	  to	  incorporate	  old	  political	  leaders,	  anti-­‐Abacha	  businessmen	  and	  even	  senior	  
military	  personnel	  (Hoffman	  2014),	  but	  given	  its	  broad	  base	  internal	  conflicts	  over	  power	  
were	  always	  rife.	  For	  instance	  the	  party	  had	  more	  than	  11	  chairmen	  between	  1999	  and	  2015	  
(Katsina	  2016).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  party	  also	  faced	  a	  very	  fragmented	  opposition,	  who	  
were	  never	  serious	  electoral	  threats.	  Finally,	  it	  managed	  to	  win	  in	  the	  north	  despite	  being	  a	  
Southern	  party	  because	  it	  was	  able	  to	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  leaders	  from	  the	  North	  like	  
Ibrahim	  Babangida,	  Umaru	  Yar’Adua	  and	  Atiku	  Abubakar.	  Buhari	  was	  incidentally	  its	  main	  
challenger	  in	  the	  North	  both	  in	  2003	  and	  2007.	   
The	  success	  of	  the	  PDP	  was	  also	  instrumental	  in	  changing	  the	  power	  balance	  in	  Nigeria	  after	  
the	  democratic	  transition	  (Hoffman	  2014).	  Most	  of	  the	  country’s	  military	  dictators	  were	  
from	  the	  North,	  and	  the	  democratic	  period	  enabled	  the	  mainly	  Yoruba	  south	  to	  perceive	  it	  
had	  won	  back	  some	  of	  the	  power	  that	  was	  with	  northern	  Hausa-­‐Fulani	  leaders	  under	  
successive	  military	  regimes	  (Hoffman	  2014).	  What	  followed	  was	  a	  series	  of	  checks	  and	  
balances	  that	  allowed	  leaders	  from	  the	  main	  socio-­‐political	  groups	  to	  accommodate	  each	  
other.	  This	  included	  the	  zoning	  pact	  set	  up	  by	  the	  PDP	  informally,	  and	  the	  decision	  of	  19	  
northern	  governors	  to	  let	  Goodluck	  Jonathan	  take	  on	  the	  presidency	  when	  it	  was	  the	  ‘turn’	  
of	  a	  Northerner	  to	  do	  so.	  However	  Jonathan’s	  increasingly	  partisan	  politics	  did	  alienate	  the	  
North,	  and	  Buhari’s	  presidency	  with	  an	  experienced	  and	  canny	  politician	  from	  the	  South	  
West	  as	  Vice	  President	  has	  helped	  redress	  some	  of	  the	  balance.	  The	  APC	  in	  fact	  took	  a	  leaf	  
out	  of	  PDP’s	  book	  by	  choosing	  Buhari	  as	  their	  candidate.	  This	  way	  they	  were	  assured	  of	  a	  
costless	  northern	  victory,	  while	  resources	  could	  be	  diverted	  to	  ensuring	  victory	  in	  the	  south.	  
That	  is	  just	  how	  it	  worked	  out.	  The	  APC	  is	  in	  power	  in	  all	  of	  the	  north	  and	  south	  west,	  while	  
the	  PDP	  is	  confined	  mainly	  to	  the	  south	  east.	  
The	  country	  has	  come	  together	  when	  required	  and	  the	  usual	  exigencies	  of	  clientelistic	  
politics	  make	  Nigeria	  not	  much	  different	  from	  other	  developing	  countries.	  However	  violence	  
and	  fragmentation	  is	  expected	  to	  increase,	  as	  various	  political	  factions	  in	  both	  the	  parties	  
start	  preparing	  for	  the	  elections.	  Competing	  power	  structures	  within	  the	  PDP	  might	  produce	  
an	  escalation	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  South	  East,	  as	  popular	  leaders	  feed	  off	  it	  to	  stamp	  their	  
authority	  and	  therefore	  credibility.	  A	  popular	  ex-­‐governor	  from	  the	  Delta	  state,	  and	  a	  fierce	  
rival	  of	  Jonathan,	  is	  now	  back	  in	  Nigeria	  after	  being	  released	  from	  prison	  in	  the	  UK.	  
Numerous	  other	  leaders	  are	  informally	  getting	  ready	  to	  announce	  their	  candidacy	  for	  2019,	  
even	  though	  the	  PDP	  has	  been	  in	  disarray	  since	  its	  loss	  in	  2015,	  with	  internal	  factional	  
politics	  growing	  in	  strength.	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Within	  the	  APC	  various	  leaders	  who	  came	  in	  from	  the	  PDP,	  or	  belonged	  to	  one	  of	  the	  four	  
parties	  that	  merged	  to	  create	  it,	  are	  making	  their	  own	  play	  for	  the	  next	  presidential	  
candidacy.	  Buhari’s	  repeated	  absences	  as	  a	  result	  of	  illness	  has	  galvanised	  both	  the	  forces	  
loyal	  to	  him	  and	  those	  in	  opposition.	  A	  former	  powerful	  ‘mentor’	  of	  the	  president,	  Bola	  
Tinubu,	  is	  said	  to	  be	  considering	  his	  future	  options	  even	  though	  his	  public	  pronouncements	  
have	  so	  far	  indicated	  that	  he	  is	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  Buhari.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  current	  vice	  
president	  is	  very	  close	  to	  Tinubu	  and	  is	  seen	  by	  some	  as	  a	  politician	  who	  is	  able	  to	  manage	  
the	  party	  in	  this	  crucial	  juncture,	  given	  the	  important	  part	  he	  played	  in	  helping	  the	  APC	  in	  
the	  south	  west.	  The	  poor	  health	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  Buhari’s	  failure	  to	  address	  these	  
problems,	  his	  absences	  due	  to	  illness,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  only	  two	  years	  left	  until	  the	  
next	  election	  have	  combined	  to	  expose	  the	  APC’s	  weakness	  as	  a	  coalition	  of	  interests	  rather	  
than	  a	  political	  party.	  However	  the	  PDP	  is	  not	  very	  different,	  and	  this	  leaves	  the	  field	  open	  
for	  more	  floor	  crossings	  and	  defections.	  In	  such	  a	  situation	  various	  calls	  for	  and	  against	  a	  
‘restructuring’	  of	  Nigeria	  have	  been	  raised	  by	  contending	  politicians,	  in	  order	  to	  score	  
populist	  points	  with	  various	  constituencies.	  South	  Eastern	  states	  are	  also	  calling	  for	  a	  re-­‐
opening	  of	  the	  ‘derivation	  principle’	  that	  governs	  the	  distribution	  of	  oil	  revenues.	  The	  danger	  
lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  populist	  politics	  can	  rarely	  be	  calibrated	  and	  could	  gain	  a	  damaging	  
momentum	  the	  country	  can	  ill-­‐afford.	  
The	  first	  scenario	  to	  consider	  however	  would	  be	  that	  of	  Buhari	  returning	  from	  his	  current	  
illness-­‐related	  absence.	  Incumbent	  presidents	  in	  Nigeria	  get	  nominated	  for	  a	  second	  term	  by	  
the	  party	  and	  tend	  not	  to	  lose	  (except	  in	  the	  case	  Goodluck	  Jonathan	  in	  2015).	  If	  Buhari	  is	  
healthy	  enough	  and	  returns	  to	  Nigeria	  in	  the	  next	  six	  months	  to	  resume	  the	  presidency,	  then	  
he	  will	  contest	  a	  second	  term	  and	  is	  almost	  certain	  to	  win	  giving	  this	  a	  probability	  of	  close	  to	  
90	  percent.	  This	  would	  then	  lay	  to	  rest	  all	  speculation	  about	  who	  potential	  candidates	  might	  
be.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  however	  that	  the	  relatively	  smooth	  functioning	  of	  the	  presidency	  even	  
while	  he	  is	  away,	  with	  Osinbajo	  taking	  on	  the	  role	  of	  ‘acting	  president’	  is	  a	  marked	  change	  for	  
the	  country	  from	  when	  a	  similar	  situation	  in	  2009,	  with	  president	  Umaru	  Yar’Adua	  and	  vice	  
president	  Goodluck	  Jonathan,	  plunged	  the	  country	  into	  a	  political	  crisis.	  This	  time	  round	  
Buhari	  nominated	  Osinbajo	  as	  acting	  president	  before	  going	  on	  leave,	  unlike	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Yar’Adua,	  thus	  ensuring	  a	  destabilizing	  political	  vacuum	  was	  not	  created.	  	  
If	  however	  Buhari	  remains	  absent	  until	  well	  into	  2018,	  the	  chances	  are	  that	  the	  politicians	  
who	  make	  the	  first	  move	  to	  create	  coalitions	  (between	  the	  North	  and	  South	  West	  or	  North	  
and	  South	  East)	  will	  retain	  a	  first	  mover’s	  advantage.	  Tinubu,	  who	  was	  powerful	  in	  the	  South	  
West	  owing	  to	  his	  former	  position	  as	  governor	  of	  Lagos	  State,	  was	  instrumental	  in	  creating	  
such	  a	  winning	  coalition	  with	  Buhari	  in	  the	  North	  in	  2015.	  However	  his	  hold	  over	  the	  South	  
West	  is	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  it	  used	  to	  be.	  This	  does	  mean	  that	  the	  support	  of	  the	  crucial	  south	  
western	  states	  for	  an	  alternative	  and	  strong	  coalition	  is	  not	  a	  foregone	  conclusion	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  anyone	  at	  the	  moment.	  	  
The	  current	  front	  runners	  are	  Atiku	  Abubakar,	  a	  former	  vice	  president	  with	  the	  PDP	  and	  now	  
with	  the	  APC,	  and	  a	  powerful	  politician	  from	  the	  North,	  Nasir	  Ahmed	  el-­‐Rufai,	  who	  is	  the	  
current	  governor	  of	  the	  Northern	  state	  of	  Kaduna.	  Abubakar	  has	  the	  financial	  muscle	  
required	  to	  contest	  the	  election	  and	  currently	  has	  an	  edge.	  He	  has	  been	  touring	  southern	  
Nigeria	  extensively,	  where	  he	  will	  need	  the	  support	  of	  the	  region’s	  powerful	  leaders	  to	  win	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and	  is	  known	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  deal-­‐maker.	  Abubakar	  is	  still	  a	  member	  of	  the	  APC,	  but	  
should	  he	  choose	  to	  make	  a	  successful	  attempt	  to	  return	  to	  the	  PDP	  it	  could	  transform	  the	  
party	  into	  a	  national	  one	  again	  from	  the	  regional	  role	  that	  it	  has	  now	  been	  reduced	  to.	  
However,	  it	  would	  need	  other	  powerful	  defectors	  to	  also	  move	  from	  the	  APC	  to	  the	  PDP	  for	  
this	  transformation	  to	  be	  complete.	  
El-­‐Rufai,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  inherited	  the	  organisational	  capacity	  of	  the	  APC	  in	  the	  
North,	  built	  up	  by	  Buhari,	  making	  him	  a	  close	  contender.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  Buhari	  the	  
probability	  of	  one	  of	  these	  two	  leaders	  becoming	  president	  therefore	  is	  as	  high	  as	  80	  
percent,	  albeit	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  some	  ‘kingmaker’	  politicians	  like	  Bukola	  Saraki,	  the	  current	  
Senate	  president	  and	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  ‘middle	  states’	  in	  the	  country.	  Saraki	  could	  
swing	  the	  fortunes	  of	  most	  coalitions	  with	  his	  support.	  The	  chances	  of	  Osinbajo	  contesting	  
however	  are	  very	  low,	  less	  than	  30	  percent,	  given	  he	  is	  a	  Southern	  Christian	  and	  that	  this	  is	  
still	  the	  ‘turn’	  of	  the	  North	  for	  presidency	  according	  to	  Nigeria’s	  informal	  power	  sharing	  
arrangements.	  	  
Political	  networks	  can	  break	  away	  or	  set	  up	  political	  organisations	  with	  an	  ease	  that	  hasn’t	  
been	  possible	  before	  in	  Nigeria.	  This	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  destabilise	  rents	  within	  party	  
systems	  and	  threaten	  the	  viability	  of	  existing	  coalitions.	  Parties	  can	  split	  because	  political	  
organisers	  want	  more	  rents,	  not	  because	  they	  are	  not	  getting	  any	  (Roy	  2013).	  The	  two	  main	  
political	  parties	  in	  Nigeria	  are	  unlikely	  to	  face	  existential	  threats	  given	  that	  for	  them,	  as	  one	  
observer	  said,	  ‘ideology	  is	  fungible’	  and	  crossing	  the	  floor	  is	  always	  an	  option.	  This	  is	  because	  
the	  Nigerian	  parties	  still	  lack	  an	  institutionalised	  organisational	  structure.	  Mobilisations	  are	  
based	  more	  on	  the	  personalities	  of	  leaders	  in	  the	  parties.	  Nigerian	  governors	  have	  been	  
known	  to	  be	  able	  to	  mobilise	  effectively	  too	  and	  control	  their	  states.	  However,	  the	  last	  
elections	  showed	  that	  governors	  are	  not	  always	  able	  to	  carry	  their	  states	  with	  them,	  as	  some	  
states	  with	  PDP	  governors	  voted	  against	  the	  party.	  This	  calculation	  will	  also	  now	  have	  to	  be	  
factored	  in	  by	  contenders	  for	  the	  presidency.	  
Whatever	  the	  scenario,	  the	  pre-­‐election	  period	  in	  Nigeria	  is	  likely	  to	  see	  more	  political	  
conflict.	  And	  depending	  on	  the	  political	  coalitions	  emerging	  after	  the	  elections	  in	  2019	  some	  
observers	  are	  fearful	  of	  the	  Biafra	  issue	  again	  becoming	  a	  serious	  schism.	  Some	  political	  
observers	  believe	  the	  political	  elite	  in	  the	  South	  East	  have	  become	  too	  disconnected	  from	  
their	  constituencies,	  helping	  dissatisfaction	  take	  shape.	  A	  return	  to	  authoritarianism	  is	  
unlikely,	  as	  low	  as	  10	  percent,	  as	  the	  military	  no	  longer	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  domestic	  
politics,	  especially	  after	  Obasanjo	  dismissed	  a	  number	  of	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  military.	  
Secondly,	  given	  that	  the	  opportunities	  for	  political	  representation	  have	  now	  reached	  fairly	  
deep	  into	  the	  Nigerian	  polity,	  usurping	  power	  through	  repressive	  violence	  is	  likely	  to	  prove	  
difficult.	  The	  need	  for	  both	  wider	  inclusion	  and	  informal	  redistribution	  will	  make	  competitive	  
clientelism	  a	  likely	  feature	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  settlement	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  
term.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  some	  types	  of	  rent	  capture	  will	  continue,	  and	  that	  rent	  recipients	  
will	  be	  difficult	  to	  discipline.	  The	  next	  section	  outlines	  some	  significant	  anti-­‐corruption	  
reforms	  in	  Nigeria,	  and	  indicate	  areas	  where	  reforms	  have	  not	  worked.	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4. Anti-­‐corruption	  in	  Nigeria	  	  
The	  first	  anti-­‐corruption	  bill	  presented	  by	  Obasanjo	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  during	  his	  
second	  term	  as	  President,	  during	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy,	  was	  the	  Corrupt	  Practices	  and	  
Other	  Related	  Offences	  Act	  of	  1999.	  This	  was	  the	  precursor	  to	  the	  Independent	  Corrupt	  
Practices	  and	  Other	  Related	  Offences	  Commission	  (ICPC),	  which	  is	  charged	  with	  prosecuting	  
offenders	  in	  relation	  to	  corruption	  crimes.	  In	  2002	  this	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  Economic	  and	  
Financial	  Crimes	  Commission	  (EFCC),	  which	  had	  a	  more	  specific	  mandate	  of	  charging	  those	  
involved	  in	  financial	  crimes,	  like	  fraud,	  financing	  for	  terror,	  and	  corruption	  involving	  oil	  
related	  payments	  and	  activities.	  Earlier	  regimes	  in	  the	  country,	  especially	  the	  military	  ones,	  
were	  known	  both	  for	  their	  corrupt	  practices	  and	  their	  impunity.	  The	  regime	  of	  Abacha	  was	  
particularly	  predatorial,	  with	  the	  general	  personally	  handing	  out	  oil	  contracts	  (Obuah	  2010).	  
That	  regime	  scored	  as	  one	  the	  worst	  performers	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  perception	  of	  corruption	  
according	  to	  Afrobarometer	  (2015).	  In	  Transparency	  International’s	  ranking	  for	  the	  
Corruption	  Perception	  Index	  in	  2015	  the	  country	  was	  positioned	  at	  136	  out	  of	  170	  countries.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  country	  has	  made	  some	  progress	  according	  to	  the	  World’s	  Bank	  Ease	  
of	  Doing	  Business	  (Figure	  8).	  Of	  course	  these	  are	  perception	  indices	  which	  come	  with	  their	  
own	  problems.	  Recent	  surveys	  have	  suggested	  a	  mixed	  bag	  of	  results	  for	  Nigeria,	  but	  mostly	  
suggesting	  much	  more	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done.	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Source:	  World	  Bank	  Ease	  of	  Doing	  Business	  Indicators	  (2014	  and	  2016)	  
On	  the	  positive	  side	  the	  establishment	  of	  both	  agencies	  outlived	  the	  Obasanjo	  
administration.	  They	  were	  set	  up	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  institutional,	  governance	  and	  
macroeconomic	  reforms	  introduced	  by	  that	  administration.	  These	  efforts	  also	  included	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  Due	  Process	  Office	  (now	  Bureau	  of	  Public	  Procurement),	  set	  up	  to	  
increase	  efficiency	  and	  eliminate	  corruption	  in	  public	  procurement.	  The	  country	  also	  
adopted	  the	  Nigeria	  Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative	  (NEITI),	  to	  improve	  oil	  
sector	  governance	  (Okonjo	  Iweala	  &	  Osafo-­‐Kwakoo,	  2007).	  Other	  initiatives	  undertaken	  by	  
the	  PDP	  include	  the	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulations	  Act	  and	  the	  Money	  Laundering	  
Provisions	  Act.	  The	  EFCC	  in	  fact	  became	  a	  benchmark	  case	  study	  for	  the	  study	  of	  anti-­‐
corruption	  commissions	  in	  Africa	  (Lawson	  2009).	  The	  EFCC’s	  credibility	  came	  under	  scrutiny	  
however,	  due	  to	  its	  seeming	  focus	  on	  the	  prosecution	  of	  opponents	  of	  Obasanjo	  (Lawson	  
2009).	  Governors	  who	  were	  not	  seen	  to	  be	  close	  to	  him	  were	  often	  targeted	  by	  the	  EFCC.	  It	  
assumed	  a	  lower	  profile	  following	  the	  exit	  of	  Nuhu	  Ribadu	  and	  subsequent	  actions	  taken	  by	  
Michael	  Aaondaka,	  the	  federal	  Attorney-­‐General	  under	  the	  Yar’Adua	  administration	  who	  
sought	  to	  make	  both	  the	  EFCC	  and	  ICPC	  less	  powerful	  (Ijewereme	  2015).	  	  
In	  2014	  the	  presidency	  of	  Jonathan	  conferred	  a	  national	  honour	  to	  Abacha	  during	  the	  
centenary	  celebrations	  of	  Nigeria’s	  founding,	  in	  the	  same	  week	  as	  the	  US	  government	  
announced	  it	  was	  freezing	  USD	  483m	  in	  foreign	  accounts	  linked	  to	  Abacha.	  This	  was	  thought	  
to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  USD	  3	  billion	  that	  Abacha	  had	  taken	  from	  the	  country.	  In	  a	  manner	  this	  was	  
indicative	  of	  the	  attitude	  to	  corruption	  during	  Jonathan’s	  tenure	  in	  government.	  Some	  key	  
indicators	  in	  the	  Doing	  Business	  figures	  over	  the	  years	  of	  Johnson’s	  presidency	  suggest	  an	  
increase	  in	  perception	  of	  corruption.	  The	  strength	  of	  legal	  rights	  remained	  low	  during	  his	  
tenure,	  as	  did	  the	  time	  required	  to	  obtain	  a	  licence.	  Such	  perceptions	  of	  high	  corruption	  also	  
contributed	  to	  his	  election	  loss	  to	  Buhari	  (BBC	  2015).	  One	  of	  the	  more	  prominent	  corruption	  
scandals	  during	  Jonathan’s	  time	  as	  president	  involved	  his	  former	  national	  security	  advisor,	  
Sambo	  Dasuki.	  He	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	  arranged	  for	  fake	  contracts	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  USD	  2	  billion	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brought	  to	  light	  by	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Presidential	  Advisory	  Committee	  against	  Corruption	  
(PACAC)	  referred	  to	  Chief	  Justices	  of	  Nigeria	  who	  were	  facilitators	  for	  illegal	  deals	  (Sahara	  
Reporters	  2017).	  	  
The	  PACAC	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  key	  advisory	  body	  to	  the	  president	  on	  anti-­‐corruption	  but	  
reports	  suggest	  it	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  gain	  the	  requisite	  access	  to	  the	  president,	  suggesting	  
that	  anti-­‐corruption	  drives	  can	  be	  difficult	  even	  when	  some	  ‘political	  will’	  is	  present.	  
Instances	  of	  parliamentary	  corruption	  were	  tracked	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  divide	  by	  
the	  media	  in	  2016,	  when	  the	  Speaker	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  removed	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  
Appropriations	  Committee	  and	  allegations	  were	  traded	  about	  how	  discretionary	  allocations	  
of	  close	  to	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  budget	  were	  made.	  In	  principle,	  allocations	  should	  be	  based	  on	  
real	  expenses	  and	  not	  ‘envelopes’	  to	  be	  shared	  (Premium	  Times	  2015).	  Nigerian	  governors	  
are	  also	  given	  a	  controversial	  monthly	  ‘security	  vote’,	  a	  sum	  close	  to	  USD	  1.3m,	  ostensibly	  
for	  maintaining	  law	  and	  order	  in	  their	  states	  but	  which	  is	  completely	  unaccounted	  for.	  	  
The	  constitutional	  basis	  for	  the	  latter	  is	  often	  questioned	  but	  never	  formally	  challenged,	  
given	  that	  this	  goes	  to	  powerful	  governors	  (Vanguard	  2016;	  Naij	  2016).	  Pension	  funds	  in	  
Nigeria	  have	  also	  been	  the	  target	  of	  capture,	  with	  an	  Interpol	  notice	  out	  for	  the	  former	  head	  
of	  a	  national	  pension	  fund	  who	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	  laundered	  money	  amounting	  to	  NGN	  2	  
billion.	  Rice	  import	  quotas	  totalling	  NGN	  117	  billion	  have	  also	  been	  misused	  to	  benefit	  
enterprises	  or	  the	  ‘rice	  mafia’	  who	  did	  not	  set	  up	  any	  backward	  linkages	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  
Domestic	  Rice	  Production	  Plan	  (DRPP).	  Much	  like	  the	  oil	  refining	  sector,	  with	  its	  import	  
quotas,	  companies	  with	  rice	  import	  permits	  sold	  them	  on	  to	  traders	  who	  already	  had	  vessels	  
with	  the	  commodity	  berthed	  close	  to	  Nigerian	  waters.	  Most	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  were	  either	  
politicians,	  former	  state	  officials	  or	  businessmen	  with	  close	  political	  links.	  Most	  of	  the	  cases	  
above	  are	  instances	  of	  predatory	  corruption	  where	  theft	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  collusion	  
between	  business	  and	  state	  officials.	  	  
4.1. Corruption	  in	  the	  oil	  sector	  
It	  is	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  oil	  sector	  however	  that	  the	  instances	  of	  the	  most	  opaque	  and	  
damaging	  corruption	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Nigeria.	  Most	  variants	  are	  common	  knowledge	  
within	  the	  country	  (Sayne	  et	  al	  2015)	  and	  we	  present	  below	  only	  a	  summary	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
more	  recent	  instances	  to	  provide	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  ingrained	  the	  problem	  is.	  The	  leakages	  
operate	  through	  multiple	  mechanisms	  and	  are	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  society.	  They	  are	  
therefore	  too	  complex	  to	  uncover	  and	  the	  effects	  are	  not	  just	  computable	  in	  terms	  of	  
financial	  value.	  The	  flaring	  of	  gas,	  mostly	  illegally,	  leads	  to	  losses	  of	  around	  USD	  2.5	  billion	  
annually	  (Elaw	  Advocate	  2006).	  Acid	  rain	  caused	  by	  the	  flaring	  leads	  to	  debilitating	  
conditions	  like	  asthma	  and	  leukaemia	  (World	  Bank	  2011b.)	  The	  Kaima	  Declaration	  of	  1998,	  
fronted	  by	  Ijaw	  activists	  in	  the	  Niger	  delta	  to	  protest	  against	  collusion	  between	  the	  Nigerian	  
government	  and	  international	  oil	  companies	  (IOC),	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  
for	  the	  continuing	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  region	  (World	  Bank	  2011b).	  Bunkering	  or	  the	  theft	  
of	  crude	  directly	  from	  pipelines,	  sustains	  oil	  companies	  and	  the	  politically	  powerful	  in	  the	  oil	  
producing	  areas.	  Estimates	  suggest	  the	  loss	  is	  100,000	  bpd,	  close	  to	  Cameroon’s	  total	  
production	  (Huillery	  2007).	  Unemployment	  in	  the	  states	  producing	  oil	  can	  vary	  between	  18	  
to	  39	  percent	  (World	  Bank	  2011a).	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Corruption	  in	  the	  sector	  can	  be	  directly	  linked	  to	  how	  subsidies	  have	  been	  mismanaged	  and	  
to	  ministerial	  discretion.	  The	  national	  oil	  company,	  NNPC,	  under	  Jonathan	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  
many	  opaque	  swap	  contracts,	  where	  crude	  oil	  was	  traded	  for	  refined	  petrol.	  Known	  as	  
Offshore	  Processing	  Agreements,	  these	  corrupt	  deals	  have	  sometimes	  included	  foreign	  
companies.	  Companies	  like	  Trafigura,	  Taleveras	  and	  Ontario	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  are	  currently	  being	  
investigated	  (Reuters).	  The	  swaps	  were	  ostensibly	  to	  address	  the	  shortfall	  of	  refined	  petrol	  
in	  the	  country	  and	  linked	  to	  the	  Domestic	  Crude	  Allocation	  meant	  to	  feed	  refineries.	  
However	  the	  refineries	  do	  not	  use	  a	  majority	  of	  this	  allocation	  (Sayne	  et	  al	  2015).	  These	  
swaps	  have	  only	  now	  started	  being	  renegotiated	  (Financial	  Times	  2015).	  Exploration	  and	  
production	  contracts	  given	  to	  oil	  service	  companies	  are	  also	  largely	  opaque	  and	  handled	  by	  
the	  NNPC.	  	  
The	  then	  Central	  Bank	  of	  Nigeria	  governor,	  Lamidu	  Sanusi,	  alleged	  that	  a	  politically	  linked	  
consortium	  was	  amassing	  USD	  100m	  a	  month	  by	  misappropriating	  oil	  revenues.	  Oil	  prices	  
were	  high	  in	  FY	  2013-­‐2014	  and	  the	  Nigerian	  buffer	  fund	  based	  on	  oil	  exports,	  called	  the	  
Excess	  Crude	  Account,	  should	  have	  been	  healthy,	  but	  according	  to	  the	  CBN	  it	  had	  fallen	  from	  
USD	  11.5	  billion	  to	  USD	  2.5	  billion	  (BBC	  2014).	  Sanusi	  was	  dismissed	  by	  Jonathan	  for	  making	  
these	  allegations.	  The	  petroleum	  minister,	  Diezani	  Alison-­‐Madueke,	  in	  the	  second	  Jonathan	  
administration	  has	  been	  implicated	  in	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  where	  her	  office	  intervened	  in	  
deals	  including	  paying	  bribes	  from	  oil	  sector	  income	  to	  officials	  of	  Nigeria’s’	  Independent	  
National	  Electoral	  Commission	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  election	  outcomes	  for	  Jonathan.	  
Estimates	  put	  the	  amount	  at	  USD	  153m	  (The	  Nation	  2017).	  A	  Reuters	  article	  on	  her	  tenure	  
as	  oil	  minister	  stated	  that	  she	  presided	  over	  an	  “oil	  sector	  that	  leaked	  tens	  of	  billions	  of	  
dollars	  during	  her	  five-­‐year	  tenure”	  (Reuters	  2016).	  Once	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
powerful	  figures	  in	  Africa,	  she	  was	  arrested	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  October	  2015.	  An	  audit	  from	  
PricewaterhouseCoopers	  vindicated	  Sanusi’s	  allegations	  against	  Alison-­‐Madueke	  (Financial	  
Times	  2015).	  High	  profile	  cases	  are	  continuing	  to	  be	  pursued	  against	  her	  even	  while	  she	  is	  
out	  on	  bail	  in	  the	  UK.	  Any	  conviction	  in	  her	  cases	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  victory	  for	  Buhari’s	  
anti-­‐corruption	  campaign,	  which	  has	  somewhat	  flagged.	  
The	  NNPC	  was	  also	  responsible	  for	  a	  kerosene	  fuel	  subsidy	  that	  did	  not	  reach	  most	  
Nigerians,	  though	  it	  was	  recovering	  the	  money	  by	  billing	  the	  treasury.	  The	  Petro	  Equalization	  
Fund	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  compensate	  for	  oil	  transportation	  costs	  to	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  
country	  (so	  that	  all	  regions	  pay	  a	  uniform	  price	  for	  petroleum),	  is	  also	  often	  
misappropriated.	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  parts	  of	  northern	  Nigeria	  pay	  between	  NGN	  200	  to	  300	  
per	  litre,	  which	  is	  well	  above	  the	  administered	  price.	  Import	  quotas	  have	  hampered	  
domestic	  refining	  capacity	  as	  the	  incentives	  to	  produce	  locally	  are	  skewed	  in	  favour	  of	  
importing	  refined	  petrol.	  The	  three	  refineries	  in	  the	  country	  operate	  at	  less	  than	  half	  their	  
capacity	  (U4	  2009).	  Diesel	  is	  also	  imported	  illegally	  to	  fuel	  the	  thousands	  of	  generators	  that	  
run	  Nigeria’s	  households	  and	  small	  businesses.	  	  
Given	  that	  illegal	  activities	  like	  these	  provide	  quicker	  and	  higher	  returns	  than	  the	  short	  to	  
medium	  term	  returns	  from	  setting	  up	  domestic	  refining	  and	  production	  capacity,	  the	  odds	  
against	  developing	  domestic	  supply	  are	  high.	  Importers	  use	  their	  quotas	  to	  divert	  imported	  
fuels,	  sell	  them	  on	  to	  smugglers	  and	  make	  super-­‐normal	  profits.	  Another	  high	  profile	  oil	  
sector	  scandal	  has	  been	  that	  of	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  Malabu	  oil	  field	  with	  very	  significant	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reserves,	  with	  alleged	  kickbacks	  of	  USD	  1.3	  billion	  involving	  Royal	  Dutch	  Shell,	  Eni,	  and	  the	  
Jonathan	  administration.	  Nigeria	  is	  famous	  for	  ‘briefcase’	  or	  shell	  companies	  in	  the	  oil	  sector	  
that	  buy	  oil	  from	  NNPC	  and	  then	  sell	  on	  to	  companies	  like	  Trafigura	  and	  Gunvor	  (Panama	  
Papers;	  Sayne	  et	  al	  2015).	  The	  available	  research	  and	  the	  national	  and	  international	  media	  
thus	  provide	  substantial	  evidence	  of	  opaque	  deal-­‐making	  and	  rent	  capture	  in	  the	  oil	  sector,	  
amounting	  to	  billions	  of	  dollars	  every	  year.	  	  
4.2. Anti-­‐corruption	  in	  the	  new	  dispensation	  and	  its	  effects	  
The	  EFCC	  has	  been	  given	  new	  lease	  of	  life	  under	  the	  Buhari	  administration’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  
programme,	  as	  it	  is	  prosecuting	  some	  high-­‐profile	  cases	  including	  some	  outlined	  earlier.	  The	  
Buhari	  government	  has	  also	  implemented	  or	  carried	  through	  other	  reforms,	  like	  introducing	  
the	  Bank	  Verification	  Number	  (linking	  all	  bank	  accounts	  to	  this	  unique	  number	  in	  order	  to	  
reduce	  unaccounted-­‐for	  money),	  though	  the	  concept	  was	  introduced	  by	  the	  Jonathan	  
administration.	  The	  Treasury	  Single	  Account	  was	  introduced,	  the	  NNPC	  now	  publishes	  
monthly	  accounts	  and	  the	  PACAC	  was	  constituted.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  TSA	  was	  
begun	  during	  Jonathan’s	  administration,	  although	  its	  roll-­‐out	  was	  completed	  under	  Buhari.	  
Kaduna	  also	  became	  the	  first	  state	  to	  adopt	  the	  TSA	  under	  Governor	  El	  Rufai.	  Biometric	  
voter	  identity	  cards	  were	  introduced	  in	  the	  last	  general	  election	  under	  the	  Jonathan	  
administration,	  helping	  to	  reduce	  electoral	  fraud.	  Nigeria	  has	  also	  recently	  signed	  the	  
Multilateral	  Competent	  Authority	  Agreement	  (MCAA)	  for	  implementing	  the	  exchange	  of	  
country-­‐by-­‐country	  (CbC)	  reports.	  This	  gives	  Nigerian	  tax	  authorities	  access	  to	  information	  
on	  the	  multinational	  corporations	  of	  members	  countries,	  to	  collect	  data	  on	  issues	  of	  transfer	  
pricing	  and	  base	  erosion	  and	  profit	  shifting	  (BEPS).	  BEPS	  refers	  to	  legal	  but	  iniquitous	  tax	  
planning	  strategies	  that	  exploit	  gaps	  in	  tax	  laws	  to	  artificially	  shift	  profits	  to	  low	  or	  no-­‐tax	  
locations,	  where	  there	  is	  little	  or	  no	  economic	  activity.	  This	  is	  disadvantageous	  for	  local	  firms	  
who	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  such	  jurisdictions.	  	  
Another	  feature	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  plank	  is	  the	  whistle-­‐blower	  policy,	  which	  entitles	  
whistle-­‐blowers	  to	  between	  2.5	  and	  5	  percent	  of	  the	  amount	  recovered	  (This	  Day	  2016).	  	  
This	  has	  had	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  many	  family	  members	  reporting	  on	  their	  
relatives	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  sharing	  some	  of	  the	  wealth.	  The	  Buhari	  administration	  has	  also	  made	  
aggressive	  use	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  regulations	  to	  prevent	  capital	  flight	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  
Nigeria’s	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  were	  depleting.	  Added	  to	  this	  has	  been	  the	  use	  of	  high	  
tariffs	  on	  a	  range	  of	  products	  like	  rice,	  sugar,	  tomatoes,	  drugs	  and	  cars,	  to	  promote	  domestic	  
production.	  These	  were	  introduced	  by	  the	  Jonathan	  administration	  but	  Buhari	  has	  retained	  
them,	  despite	  evidence	  that	  smuggling	  has	  increased	  while	  local	  production	  has	  not.	  Media	  
reports	  have	  often	  criticized	  these	  policies	  because	  they	  have	  failed	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
rampant	  smuggling	  and	  in	  addition	  prices	  of	  essential	  imports	  like	  medicines	  have	  been	  
rising	  (Reuters	  2015;	  Nigeria	  Today	  2017;	  Business	  Day	  2017).	  	  
Other	  efforts	  to	  combat	  smuggling	  and	  help	  local	  industry	  include	  directives	  like	  making	  it	  
mandatory	  for	  the	  Nigerian	  Police	  force	  to	  source	  textiles	  for	  uniforms	  that	  are	  made	  in	  
Nigeria,	  rather	  than	  using	  smuggled	  textiles.	  These	  policies	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  market	  
restriction-­‐driven	  corruption,	  as	  unnecessary	  red	  tape	  can	  provide	  an	  excuse	  for	  officials	  to	  
ask	  for	  bribes.	  Incidentally	  the	  CBN	  has	  come	  in	  for	  criticism	  because	  of	  the	  opaque	  and	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inefficient	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  operated	  auction	  windows	  to	  cater	  to	  forex	  demand	  (Punch	  
2016).	  In	  a	  somewhat	  ironical	  development	  at	  odds	  with	  these	  efforts,	  the	  government	  is	  
having	  trouble	  confirming	  the	  presidential	  choice	  for	  EFCC	  chairman	  as	  the	  Senate	  president	  
and	  some	  of	  his	  supporters	  have	  been	  blocking	  the	  appointment.	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  Senate	  
president	  currently	  being	  from	  the	  APC	  though	  he	  was	  in	  the	  PDP	  before	  the	  last	  election.	  
These	  contradictions	  within	  government	  highlight	  the	  difficulties	  in	  pursuing	  anti-­‐corruption	  
agendas	  in	  developing	  countries.	  As	  highlighted	  in	  section	  3,	  rent-­‐seeking	  can	  have	  welfare	  
enhancing	  outcomes	  if	  the	  rent	  is	  used	  for	  productive	  purposes.	  This	  implies	  an	  amount	  of	  
discretionary	  decision-­‐making	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  executive	  that	  does	  not	  always	  map	  on	  to	  
anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  This	  is	  a	  nuanced	  analysis	  but,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  market	  
failures	  in	  the	  financing	  of	  learning,	  enterprises	  in	  late	  developers	  can	  sometimes	  use	  
discretionary	  allocations	  to	  build	  organisational	  capability	  and	  become	  competitive	  (Khan	  
2013;	  Roy	  2013).	  A	  paradoxical	  effect	  of	  stringent	  anti-­‐corruption	  measures	  across	  the	  board	  
in	  Nigeria	  is	  that	  businesses	  can	  become	  loath	  to	  make	  new	  investments	  in	  emerging	  
industries,	  using	  access	  to	  informal	  rents	  for	  fear	  of	  being	  investigated.	  High	  tariffs	  in	  a	  
situation	  where	  local	  capability	  is	  still	  far	  from	  being	  developed	  means	  smuggled	  goods	  are	  
meeting	  the	  shortfall.	  And	  local	  banks	  have	  figured	  out	  ways	  to	  avoid	  the	  official	  exchange	  
rate	  and	  indulge	  in	  ‘round	  tripping’,	  where	  funds	  obtained	  at	  the	  official	  low	  rates	  are	  round-­‐
tripped	  internationally	  to	  achieve	  higher	  rates	  of	  return.	  Many	  banks	  also	  sell	  foreign	  
currency	  on	  the	  black	  market,	  as	  most	  Nigerians	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  foreign	  exchange	  at	  
the	  official	  rate.	  This	  makes	  money	  for	  dealers	  and	  banks	  but	  leaves	  those	  who	  need	  forex	  
for	  genuine	  business	  transactions	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  (Nigerians	  Talk	  2016).	  	  
Serious	  local	  producers	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  invest	  see	  no	  point	  given	  the	  low	  prices	  at	  which	  
smuggled	  goods	  are	  sold,	  and	  those	  who	  have	  invested	  are	  losing	  money.	  This	  lack	  of	  
investment	  is	  exacerbating	  the	  slowdown	  in	  the	  economy,	  and	  Buhari	  is	  being	  openly	  criticised	  
for	  being	  more	  enthusiastic	  about	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  than	  about	  efforts	  to	  revive	  the	  
economy.	  While	  business	  is	  hampered	  by	  uncertainty,	  Buhari	  is	  unable	  to	  rein	  in	  the	  Senate	  
president,	  as	  he	  is	  a	  powerful	  functionary	  in	  the	  APC,	  who	  brought	  in	  a	  set	  of	  important	  
supporters	  from	  the	  PDP	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  APC	  needed	  political	  support	  to	  match	  the	  PDP.	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  of	  the	  Buhari	  administration	  need	  to	  be	  
lauded,	  but	  they	  also	  need	  to	  be	  more	  strategic	  and	  targeted.	  A	  very	  broadly-­‐defined	  anti-­‐
corruption	  policy	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  implemented	  given	  the	  characteristics	  of	  developing	  
country	  political	  settlements.	  Partial	  implementation	  can	  adversely	  affect	  the	  needs	  of	  a	  
growing	  economy,	  especially	  where	  enterprises	  in	  many	  sectors	  have	  low	  capabilities	  and	  
require	  access	  to	  formal	  or	  informal	  rents	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  any	  learning	  opportunities.	  
Equally,	  ambitious	  rule	  of	  law	  reforms	  are	  difficult	  to	  implement	  when	  political	  transfers,	  even	  
when	  illegal,	  help	  to	  build	  networks	  of	  support	  within	  political	  parties	  and	  cement	  disparate	  
regions	  and	  groups	  together.	  Political	  corruption	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  eliminate	  without	  
substantial	  increases	  in	  formal	  transfers	  through	  the	  budget.	  According	  to	  our	  analysis	  of	  
political	  settlements,	  sectors	  with	  credible	  potential	  for	  productivity	  growth	  need	  to	  be	  
identified	  where	  support	  from	  some	  of	  the	  players	  can	  be	  mobilised	  to	  implement	  reform	  at	  
the	  sectoral	  level.	  Once	  a	  broad	  based	  productive	  economy	  begins	  to	  emerge,	  support	  for	  
more	  ambitious	  rule	  of	  law	  reforms	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  come	  by	  (Khan	  et	  al	  2017).	  The	  next	  
section	  identifies	  some	  of	  these	  sectors	  and	  opportunities	  in	  Nigeria.	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5. Strategic	  opportunities	  for	  anti-­‐
corruption	  in	  Nigeria	  
A	  recent	  report	  by	  PricewaterhouseCoopers	  estimates	  three	  scenarios	  to	  simulate	  “foregone	  
output”	  and	  “output	  opportunity”	  for	  Nigeria,	  based	  on	  the	  country	  catching	  up	  with	  Ghana,	  
Colombia	  and	  Malaysia.	  In	  each	  of	  the	  cases	  Nigeria’s	  GDP	  could	  be	  respectively	  USD	  327bn,	  
USD	  270bn	  and	  USD	  534bn	  higher	  in	  2030,	  if	  corruption	  can	  be	  brought	  down	  to	  the	  levels	  
of	  these	  countries	  (PricewaterhouseCoopers	  2015).	  The	  policy	  solutions	  that	  are	  suggested	  
to	  achieve	  this	  are	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  reforms,	  like	  improving	  transparency	  and	  public	  
sector	  reform.	  As	  long-­‐term	  goals	  these	  are	  necessary	  reforms.	  However,	  as	  this	  paper	  
highlights,	  ambitious	  anti-­‐corruption	  reforms	  that	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  political	  
settlement	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  met	  with	  resistance	  and	  failure.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  sets	  the	  
primary	  constraints	  for	  the	  uptake	  of	  different	  types	  of	  policy.	  The	  best	  way	  to	  ensure	  policy	  
success	  is	  to	  identify	  opportunities	  for	  strategic	  and	  incremental	  changes	  that	  are	  actually	  
supported	  by	  some	  powerful	  players	  in	  particular	  sectors	  in	  their	  own	  interest.	  
The	  guiding	  principles	  of	  our	  selection	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  at	  a	  sector	  level	  are	  
feasibility	  and	  impact.	  Both	  can	  be	  assessed	  using	  a	  mapping	  of	  rents	  and	  political	  
settlements	  at	  the	  national	  and	  sectoral	  levels.	  We	  have	  adopted	  a	  sectoral	  approach	  
because	  we	  believe	  reform	  in	  these	  adverse	  contexts	  has	  to	  be	  low	  key,	  and	  focus	  on	  sectors	  
and	  issues	  where	  some	  powerful	  sectoral	  players	  will	  support	  anti-­‐corruption	  in	  their	  own	  
interest.	  We	  have	  also	  identified	  sectors	  with	  productive	  potential,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  
contributing	  to	  broad-­‐based,	  inclusive	  employment.	  Every	  country	  has	  sectors	  and	  pockets	  
of	  productivity	  where	  entrepreneurs	  will	  welcome	  reform,	  because	  specific	  types	  of	  anti-­‐
corruption	  will	  help	  them	  to	  be	  more	  profitable.	  This	  is	  particularly	  likely	  if	  they	  are	  already	  
close	  to	  achieving	  competitiveness.	  Growth-­‐enhancing	  policies	  in	  such	  sectors	  are	  less	  likely	  
to	  get	  captured,	  given	  that	  competitive	  opportunities	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  attractive	  
and	  may	  induce	  productive	  coalitions	  to	  support	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  unproductive	  rent	  capture	  
by	  the	  corrupt.	  For	  instance,	  while	  successful	  reforms	  in	  the	  oil	  sector	  may	  have	  a	  very	  high	  
impact	  if	  they	  could	  be	  implemented,	  we	  do	  not	  think	  it	  is	  immediately	  feasible	  to	  
implement	  effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  reforms	  in	  the	  oil	  sector	  (despite	  the	  privatisation	  bill	  
pending	  in	  parliament).	  The	  interests	  involved	  are	  far	  too	  powerful	  and	  the	  stakes	  too	  high	  
to	  feasibly	  change	  these	  processes	  significantly	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term.	  There	  are,	  
however,	  sectors	  like	  textiles,	  pharmaceuticals	  or	  skills	  development	  where	  anti-­‐corruption	  
reforms	  could	  be	  both	  feasible	  and	  impactful.	  Figure	  9	  below	  outlines	  the	  research	  areas	  
that	  we	  feel	  should	  be	  prioritised	  based	  on	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  settlement.	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ACE	  Strategies	  
1.	  Aligning	  incentives	  
These	  will	  be	  strategies	  to	  restructure	  incentives.	  Here,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  is	  to	  change	  the	  relative	  
returns	  to	  activities	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  a	  connected	  production	  or	  value	  chain	  to	  create	  support	  for	  specific	  anti-­‐corruption	  
initiatives.	  	  
2.	  Designing	  for	  differences	  
These	  are	  strategies	  to	  enhance	  compliance	  by	  addressing	  differences	  in	  organizational	  interests.	  Here	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategy	  is	  to	  address	  differences	  in	  the	  interests	  and	  capabilities	  of	  different	  types	  of	  organizations	  to	  enable	  
the	  potentially	  compliant	  to	  comply	  and	  selecting	  appropriate	  strategies	  for	  dealing	  with	  others.	  	  
3.	  Building	  coalitions	  
These	  are	  strategies	  of	  organizing	  collective	  action.	  The	  primary	  focus	  of	  these	  strategies	  is	  to	  organize	  groups	  to	  engage	  in	  
effective	  collective	  action	  to	  support	  the	  enforcement	  of	  particular	  aspects	  of	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy.	  	  
4.	  Resolving	  rights	  
These	  are	  strategies	  for	  addressing	  contested	  rights.	  
Some	  corruption	  problems	  emerge	  because	  there	  are	  overlapping	  or	  contested	  rights	  and	  the	  only	  resolution	  available	  to	  
the	  contesting	  parties	  may	  be	  to	  engage	  in	  corruption	  as	  a	  way	  of	  resolving	  disputes.	  See	  Khan	  et	  al	  (2017)	  for	  more	  details.	  	  
(N):	  projects	  that	  only	  cover	  Nigeria,	  (BNT):	  cross-­‐country	  projects	  that	  cover	  Bangladesh,	  Nigeria	  and	  Tanzania.	  	  
Source:	  Author	  
Our	  scoping	  studies	  have	  identified	  a	  large	  number	  of	  projects	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  
sectors	  that	  involve	  productive	  activities,	  skills	  development,	  health	  and	  infrastructure.	  We	  
have	  a	  project	  on	  the	  extractives	  sector	  because	  though	  our	  analysis	  suggests	  systemic	  
reform	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  achieve,	  the	  data	  and	  evidence	  collected	  by	  mapping	  the	  
interdependent	  policies	  that	  create	  rents	  for	  different	  organisations	  and	  interests	  in	  the	  
sector	  will	  help	  us	  gain	  a	  much	  better	  idea	  of	  how	  and	  where	  the	  capture	  takes	  place	  and	  
the	  extent	  of	  the	  damage.	  By	  interdependence	  we	  do	  not	  just	  mean	  how	  the	  NNPC	  works	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includes	  health-­‐related	  negative	  externalities	  due	  to	  gas	  flaring	  in	  the	  Niger	  delta,	  the	  
transportation	  networks	  used	  in	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  Petro	  Equalization	  Fund,	  the	  dealership	  
network	  for	  generators	  used	  for	  self-­‐generation	  and	  other	  related	  issues.	  We	  will	  then	  
analyse	  where	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  address	  some	  of	  these	  issues,	  without	  focusing	  on	  more	  
problematic	  areas	  in	  this	  set	  of	  interdependencies.	  For	  instance,	  relatively	  simple	  healthcare	  
delivery	  solutions	  might	  mitigate	  the	  environmental	  externalities,	  given	  that	  stopping	  
companies	  from	  polluting	  may	  only	  be	  achievable	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  The	  ultimate	  goal	  has	  to	  
be	  to	  stop	  companies	  from	  polluting,	  but	  that	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution	  given	  the	  distribution	  
of	  power.	  In	  these	  types	  of	  areas,	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  could	  be	  mitigation	  strategies	  
that	  can	  be	  designed	  in	  incremental	  ways.	  	  
Our	  fertilizer	  sector	  research	  will	  extend	  work	  done	  on	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  the	  Growth	  
Enhancement	  Support	  Scheme	  and	  interrogate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  technology	  can	  reduce	  
unproductive	  subsidy	  capture	  or	  whether	  technology	  can	  still	  be	  manipulated	  by	  the	  local	  
power	  structure.	  Given	  the	  interest	  in	  and	  obvious	  advantages	  of	  using	  technology	  as	  an	  
enabler	  in	  anti-­‐corruption	  reform,	  this	  project	  is	  likely	  to	  produce	  new	  evidence	  on	  how	  
technology	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  interact	  in	  local	  contexts.	  
Rice	  and	  textiles	  were	  chosen	  because	  both	  sectors	  are	  being	  adversely	  affected	  by	  cheap	  
imports,	  both	  legal	  and	  illegal.	  Rice	  is	  a	  staple	  in	  the	  country	  and	  provides	  subsistence	  and	  
livelihood	  to	  many	  small	  farmers,	  including	  female-­‐headed	  households.	  The	  effect	  of	  import	  
tariffs	  and	  smuggling	  on	  this	  important	  segment	  will	  be	  explored	  and	  feasible	  anti-­‐
corruption	  measures	  assessed.	  The	  textile	  sector	  has	  huge	  employment	  potential,	  and	  it	  did	  
live	  up	  to	  this	  it	  until	  a	  few	  decades	  ago.	  Though	  the	  sector	  has	  recently	  been	  declining,	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  ample	  scope	  for	  development	  of	  artisanal	  supply	  chains	  and	  networks	  
that	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  export	  markets,	  similar	  to	  strategies	  in	  countries	  like	  India.	  Anti-­‐
corruption	  can	  be	  pursued	  at	  the	  sectoral	  level,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  interdependent	  policies	  
that	  support	  productive	  activities	  by	  organisations	  that	  reduce	  the	  incentive	  for	  corruption,	  
and	  create	  support	  for	  anti-­‐corruption	  activities	  of	  these	  specific	  types.	  	  	  
Vocational	  skills	  and	  education	  are	  of	  significant	  importance	  to	  Nigeria	  for	  obvious	  reasons.	  
The	  technical	  education	  sector	  has	  to	  become	  more	  market-­‐facing	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  very	  
heterogeneous	  firms	  across	  sectors	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  while	  designing	  policy.	  
One	  reason	  why	  skills	  programmes	  fail	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  that	  employers	  lack	  the	  
capabilities	  to	  use	  skilled	  workers	  effectively	  and	  are	  therefore	  unwilling	  to	  pay	  a	  premium	  
for	  better-­‐trained	  workers.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  why	  skills	  trainers	  engage	  in	  
corruption	  to	  get	  their	  funding	  released,	  when	  this	  is	  linked	  to	  successful	  employment	  or	  
wage	  increases	  of	  their	  cohorts.	  Reducing	  this	  type	  of	  corruption	  may	  require	  recognising	  
and	  addressing	  the	  differences	  in	  capabilities	  of	  both	  employers	  and	  trainers,	  and	  
developing	  joined-­‐up	  strategies	  where	  a	  majority	  of	  employers	  and	  trainers	  can	  behave	  
productively	  without	  engaging	  in	  corruption.	  This	  can	  help	  create	  sectoral	  support	  for	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies.	  The	  issues	  around	  corruption	  in	  education	  involve	  local	  government	  
and	  social	  accountability	  and	  our	  research	  design	  will	  take	  this	  into	  account.	  	  
Our	  project	  on	  strategies	  of	  accumulation	  will	  provide	  a	  key	  source	  of	  evidence	  on	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  we	  will	  trace	  the	  evolution	  of	  successful	  business	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houses	  across	  our	  three	  countries.	  The	  project	  will	  analyse	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  state	  
business	  relationships	  and	  the	  continuum	  along	  which	  patron-­‐client	  relationships	  work	  to	  
identify	  when	  rents	  are	  used	  for	  productive	  purposes	  and	  when	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  get	  
captured.	  This	  could	  have	  significant	  bearing	  on	  policies	  for	  private	  sector	  led	  growth.	  	  	  
The	  problems	  in	  the	  power	  sector	  are	  similar	  in	  nature	  to	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector,	  largely	  
because	  the	  main	  issue	  in	  Nigeria	  is	  the	  supply	  of	  gas	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  cost	  
reflective	  tariff.	  Though	  this	  is	  a	  quasi-­‐public	  good,	  the	  sector	  in	  Nigeria	  is	  mostly	  privatised	  
and	  hence	  solutions	  would	  need	  to	  involve	  the	  private	  sector.	  Corruption	  in	  the	  sector	  is	  
driven	  by	  policy	  capture	  by	  politically	  connected	  firms	  in	  generation	  and	  distribution.	  Our	  
research	  will	  look	  at	  generation	  alternatives	  that	  are	  less	  capital	  intensive	  and	  involve	  the	  
possibility	  of	  bringing	  together	  manufacturing	  associations	  for	  embedded	  generation.	  Anti-­‐
corruption	  in	  power	  generation,	  and	  therefore	  more	  efficient	  generation	  and	  distribution,	  
may	  be	  easier	  to	  achieve	  by	  developing	  other	  strategies	  of	  generating	  power.	  Our	  other	  
project	  in	  the	  public	  goods	  category	  is	  on	  land.	  Property	  rights	  over	  land	  are	  complex	  in	  
most	  developing	  countries	  due	  to	  their	  colonial	  histories	  and	  the	  transition	  from	  traditional	  
landholding	  structures	  to	  modern	  land	  rights	  that	  support	  capitalist	  land	  markets.	  
Communal,	  traditional	  and	  modern	  definitions	  of	  property	  rights	  co-­‐exist,	  making	  many	  
transactions	  opaque	  and	  subject	  to	  political	  interventions	  and	  pricing	  out	  the	  poor	  from	  
effective	  strategies	  of	  protecting	  their	  rights.	  Our	  research	  on	  land	  will	  explore	  the	  best	  
methods	  to	  resolve	  these	  conflicts.	  
Our	  pharmaceutical	  and	  health	  sector	  projects	  will	  look	  at	  the	  health	  supply	  chain	  from	  end	  
to	  end.	  At	  one	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  we	  will	  explore	  how	  local	  pharma	  producers	  can	  increase	  
productivity	  and	  overcome	  the	  problem	  of	  smuggled	  drugs	  and	  illegal	  wholesale	  markets,	  by	  
undertaking	  corporate	  governance	  reforms	  that	  will	  help	  them	  build	  more	  credibility	  and	  
access	  capital	  markets	  to	  build	  organisational	  capability	  and	  an	  R&D	  base.	  The	  delivery	  side	  
will	  provide	  insights	  into	  incentives	  of	  healthcare	  providers	  and	  why	  they	  indulge	  in	  corrupt	  
practices,	  such	  as	  not	  attending	  the	  public	  hospitals	  that	  employ	  them	  and	  instead	  diverting	  
patients	  to	  their	  own	  private	  practices.	  Addressing	  these	  problems	  requires	  a	  much	  better	  
understanding	  of	  behavioural	  choices	  of	  doctors	  and	  other	  service	  providers,	  so	  that	  
appropriate	  combinations	  of	  policies	  can	  be	  devised	  to	  reduce	  some	  of	  these	  instances	  of	  
corruption.	  	  
Our	  last	  category	  is	  that	  of	  governance	  agencies	  and	  media.	  The	  EFCC	  is	  an	  obvious	  choice	  in	  
Nigeria	  for	  a	  research	  project	  on	  the	  political	  underpinnings	  and	  limitations	  of	  anti-­‐
corruption	  institutions.	  The	  EFCC	  has	  a	  number	  of	  achievements	  to	  its	  credit,	  but	  is	  also	  
hamstrung	  by	  the	  constraints	  set	  by	  the	  political	  settlement.	  Our	  research	  will	  identify	  the	  
types	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  interventions	  where	  it	  has	  achieved	  greater	  success,	  and	  explore	  the	  
implications	  for	  targeting	  its	  efforts	  so	  that	  it	  achieves	  better	  overall	  results.	  Our	  innovative	  
bribery	  game	  will	  experiment	  with	  the	  efficacy	  of	  different	  types	  of	  messaging	  for	  anti-­‐
corruption	  campaigns,	  and	  provide	  inputs	  for	  more	  effective	  communication	  design	  for	  
public	  agencies.	  Finally	  our	  project	  on	  how	  the	  media	  reports	  on	  corruption	  will	  address	  the	  
sensitive	  issue	  of	  how	  reportage	  can	  be	  made	  more	  credible	  and	  effective.	  Apart	  from	  
improving	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  and	  numbers,	  we	  argue	  that	  reporting	  on	  corruption	  needs	  to	  
be	  mindful	  of	  feasible	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies,	  so	  that	  the	  media	  does	  not	  inadvertently	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contribute	  to	  mudslinging	  matches	  between	  government	  and	  opposition	  that	  has	  little	  
sustainable	  effect	  on	  anti-­‐corruption.	  This	  is	  a	  challenging	  goal,	  but	  we	  believe	  the	  ACE	  
approach	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  defining	  sustainable	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  and	  
we	  will	  use	  the	  media	  project	  to	  test	  aspects	  of	  our	  hypothesis	  on	  how	  anti-­‐corruption	  
reporting	  can	  achieve	  impact.	  	  
Our	  research	  projects	  have	  therefore	  been	  chosen	  keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  political	  economy	  
context	  of	  our	  countries,	  and	  are	  designed	  to	  generate	  evidence	  and	  understanding	  of	  
effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies.	  We	  have	  identified	  coalitions	  of	  interest	  both	  at	  the	  
meso	  or	  sectoral	  level,	  but	  we	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  devise	  policy	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  as	  these	  
have	  frequently	  been	  tried	  and	  have	  largely	  failed	  because	  they	  run	  up	  against	  powerful	  
interests	  in	  the	  political	  settlement.	  Our	  understanding	  is	  that	  these	  incremental	  changes	  
will	  contribute	  to	  macro-­‐level	  anti-­‐corruption	  in	  two	  ways:	  directly	  by	  reducing	  corruption	  
incrementally	  in	  a	  series	  of	  sectors;	  and	  indirectly	  through	  productivity	  growth	  that	  will	  
create	  pressure	  from	  emerging	  powerful	  groups	  for	  more	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts,	  as	  
social	  power	  and	  the	  political	  settlement	  shifts	  in	  favour	  of	  productive	  groups.	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